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Since the inception of the digital era the sharing of information has been rev-
olutionary to the way we live, inspiring the continuous evolution of computer
networks. Year by year, humankind becomes increasingly dependent on the
use of connected services as new technologies evolve and become more widely
accessible. As the widespread deployment of the Internet of Things, 5G, and
connected cars rapidly approaches, with tens of billions of new devices connect-
ing to the Internet, there will be a plethora of new faults and attacks that will
require the need to be tracked and managed. This enormous increase on Internet
reliance which is stretching the limits of current solutions to network monitor-
ing introduces security concerns, as well as challenges of scale in operation and
management. Todays conventional network monitoring and management lacks
the flexibility, visibility, and intelligence required to eﬀectively operate the next
generation of the Internet. The advent of network softwarisation provides new
methods for network management and operation, opening new solutions to net-
work monitoring and remediation. In parallel, the increase in maturity of Edge
computing lends itself to new solutions for scaling network softwarisation, by
deploying services throughout the network.
In this thesis, two proof-of-concept systems are presented which together
harness the use of Software Defined Networking, Network Functions Virtuali-
sation, and Cloud-to-Fog computing to address challenges of scale and network
security: Siren is an open platform which manages the resources within the
Internet, bridging network and infrastructure management and orchestration.
iii
Tennison is a network monitoring and remediation framework which tackles
monitoring scalability through adapting to network context and providing a
suitable architecture to the network topology, including the use of centralised,
distributed, and hierarchical deployments.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Historically, computer networks were purpose-built services exclusive to a few
closed communities [113]. Since the commercialisation of the Internet in the 90s,
computer networks have grown to become a critical infrastructure that under-
pins many of the amenities and fundamental services that humankind globally
have grown accustomed to in modern life. Today, the Internet has a wide range
of uses including: media consumption, social interaction, information retrieval,
and communication. The Internet is a tool that since its birth has been contin-
ually pushing the limits of its design further [47, 9]. As a result of an increase
in demand [1] and reliance on computer networks and the Internet, network op-
erators are faced with increasing challenges of security, management scalability,
resource allocation, and configuration complexity [21, 103, 102]. Additionally,
due to the inflexibility of the current Internet implementation, advancements
on its design are challenging [9].
In an era where the Internet is moving beyond simple data sharing to op-
erating autonomous cars and cities, security is of uppermost importance, and
the implications of a lack of security are severe [224, 201]. Despite the relative
maturity of the Internet, the network and services on it are often still vulnerable
to attacks, with the threat of total outages as a result. Importantly, attacks
from inside the network are often more threatening than remote ones, resulting
in orders of magnitude greater cost [119]. However, the edge of the network is
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often neglected due to the diﬃculty and cost of deploying to this. Nonetheless,
edge networks still need to be considered from a security point of view to eﬀec-
tively protect businesses and homes [192]. The importance of this has further
increased with the emergence of 5G, where services are deployed throughout
the network [10].
The intersection of these challenges motivates a combined approach to net-
work security, which moves away from the current trend of protecting networks
at their gateways. This thesis suggests that networks should be secured at
multiple points, providing dynamic security that is proportionate to network
context.
1.1 Contemporary Network Monitoring and Re-
mediation
Network monitoring and remediation in today’s computer networks is typically
separated into various modular components. This includes a method of mon-
itoring, data management, and remediation. With these, network operators
face challenges when managing network anomalies and attacks, primarily due
to limited data and the inability to correlate network events together [191].
Frameworks such as S-FlowRT [138], OpenNMS [16], and Zabbix [223] are used
to assist network operators with network monitoring, consolidating monitoring
data. On their own, these tools are limited in scalability, support for adaptation,
and general flexibility [206].
In terms of network monitoring solutions, integrated oﬀerings such as mid-
dles boxes provided in Intrusion Protection Systems add additional delay to the
network and are prone to vendor lock-in, again oﬀering limited flexibility [186].
Due to the operational and capital cost, time, and network impact of these tools,
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they are only placed at key locations within a network, limiting the visibility
and control of monitoring within the network.
In summary, current network monitoring and remediation solutions oﬀer
limited visibility, flexibility, control, and extensibility all whilst requiring high
operational and capital costs. Given the ever growing use of the Internet, and
the increase in devices on the Internet, this is an aspect networking that would
greatly benefit from a new approach.
1.2 Prospects for Next Generation Networking
Telecommunications, Cloud, and edge technologies coming to the next genera-
tion of the Internet have the potential for great impact within the networking
world, incrementally assisting in breaking away from the previously frigid de-
sign.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) has emerged as a concept for the dy-
namic control of configuration of computer networks. Arguably, its primary
reason for success is the capability to implement conventional networks whilst
extending them, allowing for partial adoption of the technology. Fundamentally,
SDN separates the control and data planes within the network. This control
is then ceded to a software-based controller, that defines the behaviour and
operation of the network. The characteristics of SDN include a holistic view
and ability to dynamically program the network. In addition, the protocol for
communication for the control plane, OpenFlow [147], is then used to manipu-
late the data plane, defining counters for each flow entry/rule in the switch flow
table. The flow rule definition also supports a large number of packet header
fields, of which support the collection of network statistics which can be used
for traﬃc monitoring.
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These characteristics enable a powerful feedback loop as follows: network
attacks can be detected by capturing traﬃc flow information and analysing
the flow statistics with respect to known signatures/patterns or through the
application of machine learning techniques. Having detected an attack by a
volume, type or pattern of traﬃc, an appropriate action can be performed. In
this situation, the benefit of SDN is that it can be used to program the flow rules
to block or filter traﬃc, or apply another remediation mechanism. However,
a performance/accuracy trade-oﬀ arises when deploying a traﬃc monitoring
service at scale. The volume of information to be collected can lead to overall
performance degradation, whilst introducing a longer collection interval can lead
to inaccuracy or delayed remediation. The impact of the volume of monitoring
data is particularly significant in a centralised SDN security system which carries
the potential to overwhelm the controller processing functions. It is possible for
the monitoring of a DoS attack to generate suﬃcient monitoring traﬃc towards
the controller that the controller itself becomes subject to DoS [172]. A solution
is therefore required to oﬀer a flexible and proportionate monitoring capability
with distributed functionality to disperse the control and monitoring load for
scalability and resilience.
As the prospect of implementing 5G and Network Functions Virtualisation
(NFV) becomes closer to reality, there is a need for an architectural change
to the way that virtual network services are deployed. Emerging computing
architectures such as Edge and Fog Computing are shown as key technology
enablers for scalability and responsiveness for both NFV and 5G [117]. By tying
SDN, NFV, Fog computing, and network security together, Figure 1.1 shows
an architectural overview for a next generation network monitoring system.
When presented with new technologies, many unique and seemingly useful
systems are created, however, these are often come with caveats. In particular,
solutions in the research area of network orchestration and security either oﬀer




















Figure 1.1: Next generation network monitoring architecture
little improvement or are designed to work with a single environment, often
lacking features such as scalability and general applicability. This thesis targets
the aforementioned gap in networking research, presenting two complementary
prototype systems each with their own design, which both target scalability
through diﬀerent means, one focusing on Cloud-to-Fog infrastructure orches-
tration and the other on eﬃcient SDN monitoring and remediation. Together,
these designs create a solution to scalable and responsive SDN monitoring and
remediation for the Cloud-to-Fog continuum.
1.3 Thesis Statement
This thesis testifies that by using a multi-faceted approach to SDN monitoring, a
scalable solution to eﬀective and detailed monitoring is possible. Such a solution
includes utilising distributed service placement, separating networks into islands
of monitoring, and an eﬃcient design that is capable of proportionally adapting
to threat.
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1.4 Thesis Aims and Contributions
The contributions and aims of this thesis are as follows:
1. Design for a scalable SDN monitoring framework (Tennison):
This thesis aims to design a modernised software solution to network mon-
itoring. This is achieved through analysis of existing monitoring solutions
as well as integration of a variety of emerging technologies. In particular,
this thesis makes use of Network Functions Virtualisation, Fog Comput-
ing, and Software Defined Networking to achieve scalable and responsive
monitoring.
2. Design for a Cloud-to-Fog management and orchestration NFV
platform (Siren): To achieve scalable monitoring, this thesis details
the design of a Cloud-to-Fog system capable of orchestrating and connect-
ing monitoring components enabling Network Functions Virtualisation for
Tennison. This is achieved by reviewing and adapting existing Cloud
NFV specifications and technologies to work in variety of heterogeneous
environments.
3. A realisation of the scalable SDN monitoring design through
a proof-of-concept: Based on the design of Tennison, a prototype
implementation is created to understand and iterative improve upon the
Tennison design through observation the implications of SDN monitor-
ing in reality. This proof-of-concept is the primary aspect of this thesis,
which is evaluated for verification of thesis goals, such that the design
performs as expected and that scalable and responsive SDN monitoring
is feasible.
4. A realisation of the Cloud-to-Fog management and orchestration
through proof-of-concept: Based on the design of Siren, a prototype
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implementation for a Cloud-to-Fog based NFV management and orches-
tration platform is created to demonstrate the benefit of distributed NFV.
Critical to the primary goal of this thesis, the Siren proof-of-concept is
also used to enable Cloud-to-Fog NFV for Tennison.
5. An evaluation of both Tennison’s and Siren’s impact and perfor-
mance at scale: The evaluation of both Tennison and Siren deployed
and tested at scale shows the capabilities of the design as well as poten-
tial avenues for improvements made possible by forthcoming technologies.
Furthermore, evaluating these systems in real-world examples, including
detecting and remediating against live attacks at scale, both exercises and
satisfies this thesis’s claims as detailed in Section 1.3.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured into seven chapters details as follows:
• Chapter 2 (Background and Related Work) initially highlights the
need for, as well as ongoing movement towards, software-based network
solutions. Following this, it describes the history and evolution of pro-
grammable networks, going into detail on various methods of implement-
ing Software Defined Networks and Network Functions Virtualisation. It
then goes on to review the related work in SDN, monitoring, security, and
scalability. The chapter concludes by highlighting the gaps in research
that need to be filled in order to satisfy the aforementioned aims.
• Chapter 3 (Design) starts oﬀ by describing the Cloud-to-Fog contin-
uum, showing its growth over the past 20 years, concluding with its ap-
plicability as an enabler for NFV. It then goes on to demonstrate through
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a content caching use case the benefits of deploying network services in-
telligently to the edge of networks. Finally, it explores and brings to light
the limitations of current solutions in this area, highlighting a gap for a
new NFV orchestration system. This then moves on to discus the various
design considerations for monitoring, deployment, and orchestration. Fi-
nally, the core of the chapter is revealed, detailing the design of the two
primary architectural contributions in this thesis.
• Chapter 4 (Implementation) describes in technical detail the inno-
vations that were required for the aims of this thesis. In particular, the
implementation of the Cloud-to-Fog NFV orchestration system as well
as a scalable SDN monitoring framework, which are named Siren and
Tennison respectively are highlighted. On top of this, various smaller
technical contributions are highlighted, such as NFV Overlays and an
automated experimentation framework.
• Chapter 5 (Evaluation) demonstrates the capabilities of the imple-
mented systems, showing details on scalability, responsiveness. This chap-
ter also highlights the trade-oﬀs and performance of Tennison in three
distinct deployment approaches: single, distributed, and tiered. Looking
forward, this section also motivates a piece of future work through an anal-
ysis of operating with P4 over OpenFlow. Finally, the Chapter presents
a functional and non-function comparison to illustrate how Tennison
compares against similar systems.
• Chapter 6 (Conclusion) concludes this thesis by firstly revisiting the
thesis statement and then providing an overview of the contributions.
The core of this chapter highlights how maturity of supporting ecosystem
in NFV and SDN benefit the proof-of-concept presented in this thesis.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents various avenues of future work around network
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monitoring and scalability in SDN using upcoming artificial intelligence
and data plane technologies.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
To date, network operators face management scalability, resource allocation,
and configuration complexity challenges [103, 102]. These are typically resolved
by over-provisioning networks, resulting in significant capital and operational
expenditure [93]. On top of this, challenges in the network are likely to worsen
in years to come as the Internet grows with the adoption of the Internet of
Things (IoT) [125], increasing traﬃc demands by an order of magnitude [98].
Collectively, this is placing pressure on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
reflect on their approach to building both network and system infrastructures
and ultimately look towards more cost-eﬀective solutions.
New networking paradigms, such as SDN and NFV oﬀer the potential for
reduced costs, better resiliency, and quicker time to market [118]. Historically,
implementations of these have been limited to Cloud based environments, more
recently, various eﬀorts have looked into moving these somewhat closer to the
edge [5]. With emerging computing architectures such as those introduced by
Fog computing, these benefits can be expanded beyond the Cloud, making way
for new services that were previously not feasible.
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2.1 Programmable networks
The concept of a flexible network that can be easily configured, managed, and
adapted has been desired since the early stages of the Internet and as such
there are various works on the topics. In the mid 1990’s a significant amount of
research was conducted into active and programmable networks [23]; this was
envisaged as way for new functionality and services to be realised within network
infrastructures. In the last 20 years, this notion of network programmability
has matured, resulting in concepts such as Network Functions Virtualisation
(NFV) and Software Defined Networks (SDN). Figure 2.1 shows a high level
overview of a modern SDN architecture.
This section highlights the key works that contributed to the concept of
programmable networks.
Network Operating system (SDN Controllers) 
Firewall MAC Learning PCE
Load 
balancer Monitoring
Figure 2.1: Simplified view of an SDN architecture
The birth of programmable networks started with Active Networking, this
proposed two distinct approaches to providing flexibility within the network:
programmable switches and capsules. The first approach does not require edit-
ing of the packet format. It assumes that switching devices support the dynamic
loading of programs, which are used to process packets. The latter, on the other
hand, suggests that packets should be replaced by micro programs, which are
encapsulated in transmission frames and executed at each node along their path.
In [198] an Active Network is described as a network that can be programmed re-
motely and can perform computation and modify packets within the data plane.
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Active Networking is form of Active Technologies [198], a previous innovation in
the computer systems field. In particular, this extends Active Messaging [211]
in order to provide programmability to the network, with the aim of alleviating
previous challenges in conventional networks, in this case known as "passive"
networks.
It is thought that one of the first inspirations for programmable networks
was through an idea that was conceived in the late 80s [105] called NCP [46]
which relied on the separation the control plane from the data plane. Since
then, there have been various notable eﬀorts towards Active Networks including
Lara++ [169], RCP [67], NCP [46], Tempest [164], GSMP [65], and PCE, [33],
Tempest [164], Programming In Networks [110, 109], and Smart Packets [170].
The primary piece of work that solidified this concept was Tennenhouse’s
paper [197] which was the first to detail the potential of programmable networks
and was a corner stone for Active Networking. Many of the paper’s claims are
still relevant in contemporary programmable networks. Another stepping stone
into the evolution of Active Networking was Tempest [164], which was the first
paper on the design of an Active Network, describing how one might implement
the concept. Tempest aimed at creating an attractive and pragmatic solution
for network operators that was agnostic of precise methodology and could easily
run alongside existing solutions.
The next piece of high impact work was Smart Packets. Smart Packets [170]
is an Active Networks implementation that relies on the use of serialised Java
objects sent in single packets that represent state for the forwarding device.
Smart packets and general Active Networks did not manage to achieve wide
scale adoption by industry. This was partially due to the requirement of a clean
slate approach and the use of new specialised hardware that no mainstream
vendor was producing.
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2.1.1 Software Defined Networking
Key to the advancement of programmable networks has been the concept of
Software Defined Networking which was coined in the early 2000s [78]. The
primary development over previous research in was the separation of the control
and data planes, creating a controller based architecture. In this there have been
a lot of eﬀorts towards defining the separation of the control and data planes,
notably, 4D [87] which envisions four planes. Moving on from this is Ethane





















































Figure 2.2: Selected contributions to programmable networks
and SDN monitoring
ForCES [64], OpenFlow [121], and POF [187] represent the state of the
art of recent approaches for designing and deploying programmable data plane
devices. In a manner diﬀerent from active networks, these new concepts are
based on modifying forwarding devices to support flow tables, which can be
dynamically configured by remote entities through simple operations such as
adding, removing or updating flow rules, i.e., entries within flow tables.
Since 2015, the development of IETF’s SDN architecture ABNO [3] which
relies standards such as PCE [73], and ALTO [174] claims to oﬀer a pragmatic
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approach to SDN that is closer than previous eﬀorts to being implemented by
ISPs [3].
Outside of academia, Google’s B4 [99] is one of the most well known suc-
cesses of SDN and arguably brought the rest of industry’s interest on to it.
B4 is an SD-WAN deployment which was created to meet large bandwidth
requirements, rate-limiting, and recently with Google Espresso [217], demand
monitoring with dynamic routing at the edge. Now SDN is used by a variety of
large organisations. Adoption has increased significantly with hardware vendors
such as HP [95], CISCO [44], PICA [158], and Corsa [53] providing commer-
cialised SDN solutions. On top of this, various ISPs have grown interest in SDN
for its benefits in reduced CAPEX and OPEX [59, 15, 29, 42].
2.1.1.1 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is one of the first widely accepted implementations of SDN. Arguably,
the primary reason why OpenFlow [121] gained traction in both academia and
industry was its cleaner integration into existing networks than previous pro-
grammable network eﬀorts [105]. On top of this, vendor support with imple-
mentations meant that OpenFlow could be deployed to the network and operate
at line-rate, making it suitable for a production grade system. Figure 2.4 shows
the protocol’s control relationship with the layered Internet architecture. Open-
Flow’s first full release, OF1.0 [144] included a relatively primitive set of func-
tionality with a 12 field match actions within a single table. This was suitable
for simple routing tasks. The next popular release was OF1.3 [145]. By now the
protocol had expanded to include multiple tables, metering, and groups. These
are useful for a wider variety of applications including monitoring and quality
of service. Figure 2.3 details the OpenFlow pipeline, which includes a series of
match action tables in the data plane and an OpenFlow channel in the control
plane.
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Figure 2.3: OpenFlow Pipeline
At the time of writing, industry and hardware vendors have settled on this
version of OpenFlow, making this and previous versions compatible with the
majority of OpenFlow hardware and software. Newer versions of OpenFlow up
to 1.5 [146] oﬀer improvements on the atomicity of actions between the controller
and switches with the use of bundles and synchronised tables. OpenFlow’s
future is unclear; OpenFlow version 1.6 was drafted in 2016 but has since been
kept private to ONF members [148]. With the move to new protocols such as
P4, and increasing use of proprietary SDN protocols, OF1.3 could be the final
widely supported version of OpenFlow. This said, prior announcements [58]
from ONF for OpenFlow suggests that the protocol is going to evolve to oﬀer









Figure 2.4: OpenFlow’s Relationship with OSI model
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2.1.1.2 P4
Similar to the prior Active Networks concept, P4 (Programming Protocol-
Independent Packet Processors) provides the ability to reprogram the packet
processing core of networking hardware dynamically, the benefits of this are
demonstrated in PISCES [177], which uses P4 for routing traﬃc using custom
protocols. This oﬀers more flexibility over protocols such as OpenFlow which
are currently restricted to inflexible pipelines. As described in the first P4
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Physical
Figure 2.5: P4’s Relationship with OSI model
Due to its infancy, unlike OpenFlow, currently there are no public indus-
try deployments of P4. However, this is likely to change; as with OpenFlow,
P4 has benefited from vendor adoption with line-rate capable hardware from
BareFoot [18], and more recently Netronome [131]. Recently P4 has moved to
version 16 from 14. This new version of the language generalises the language in
order to improve portability of P4 applications between hardware. This move
will assist in future P4 deployments.
Despite OpenFlow’s success and continued progression with multiple re-
leases, SDN networks based on this protocol have various short comings such
as, restrictive programablity, controller DoS, and control plane poisoning [133].
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As shown in Figure 2.5, P4 oﬀers capability around this, allowing the network
to be specialised for its purpose, as opposed to OpenFlow which apart from a
limited pipeline configuration follows a one size fits all policy. Note that the
layers on the right hand-side of Figure 2.5 are intentionally blank illustrating
that an alternative architecture could be created with P4.
2.1.2 Scalable Programmable Networks
Since the early days of SDN and more recently with NFV, due to their cen-
tralised approach, scalability has been a concern [32]. ESTI with OSM [72]
and their MANO specification [71] have envisaged various possibilities to tackle
scale, these include the use of tiered orchestration as well as distributed virtual-
isation infrastructures. There are a number of proposed solutions to challenges
around scalability within programmable networking. These include, pushing
logic down to the switch, or distribution of the SDN control plane and network
partitioning.
2.1.2.1 In Network Intelligence
In Network Intelligence for SDN is a method of controlling the network. Specif-
ically this pushes control logic down to networking devices in order to improve
resilience, scale, and performance [128, 56]. The topic area of In Network Intel-
ligence currently has limited research as there are challenges around realising
solutions in a pragmatic way that is usable by industry.
DIFANE [220] and DevoFlow [56] are not involved with the setup of every
new flow. Instead the logic is pushed down to the switch or controller com-
munication is used sparingly where appropriate. Whilst these solutions appear
to oﬀer an idyllic solution to programmable networking, they are not currently
supported within production grade hardware.
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2.1.2.2 Distributed SDN Controller Performance
As highlighted in Chapter 1, the ability to scale up controller processing in
response to network traﬃc variations is critical to the network security system.
Both hierarchical and distributed control mechanisms have been proposed, as
surveyed in [172]. A few of these works specifically consider load-balancing.
In Kandoo [92], local decision-making is separated from network-wide decision-
making. Certain applications can be supported by event processing at local
controllers reducing the load on the root controller. ElastiCon [60] proposes an
elastic distributed controller architecture to dynamically adjust the controller
pool in response to changing traﬃc conditions.
Hydra [40] presents a solution to support latency-sensitive applications by
partitioning the control function based on functional slicing rather than topo-
logical slicing (as in [92, 60]). Functional slicing splits control plane functions
(and, therefore, applications) across servers. The performance results presented
in [40] show an improvement in controller throughput and response time un-
der increasing load for latency-sensitive applications. However, the dependency
of the solution on communication-awareness, and the anticipated variation in
communication between applications in a large-scale network would require the
placement algorithm to be run very frequently in larger networks.
Designed by ON.Lab, Open Network Operating System (ONOS) was launched
in 2014 as a SDN network operating system for service provider networks with a
focus on high availability, scalability and performance [22]. ONOS implements
distributed control with multiple controller instances forming a cluster. The
clustering of controllers is a process through which one or more controllers are
connected and data about the state of the network is shared between them.
The intention of clustering is twofold: 1) to ensure that in the event of one
controller failing the other remaining controllers in the cluster will ensure the
network remains functional, and 2) To provide scale-out to the system; making
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it possible to manage networks with 100s of networking devices and 1000s of
hosts. The ONOS cluster instances synchronise to provide the global network
view graph using the RAFT [94] consensus algorithm. The StorageService in-
terface ensures a consistent state between the databases across all the instances
of an ONOS cluster. Each network element is assigned a master ONOS instance
and the remaining instances will be on standby for that network element. If the
master instance fails, an election takes place between the remaining instances
to elect a new master. It is possible to balance the masters to provide an even
distribution of network elements to each member of the cluster.
2.1.3 Software Defined Network Monitoring and Secu-
rity
The first protection architecture for SDN was proposed in [37], prior to the
development of the OpenFlow protocol. Since the introduction of OpenFlow,
many researchers have focused on taking advantage of the characteristics of SDN
for intrusion detection, monitoring and remediation services. However, there
are several challenges to security in programmable network, as first highlighted
by [7]. The remainder of this section details research and cutting edge industry
solutions for SDN monitoring with scalability and SDN security frameworks
2.1.3.1 SDN Monitoring Solutions and Scalability
The combination of the global network view and the granularity of the network
statistics captured at the data plane has generated significant interest in net-
work monitoring advances with SDN. Combinations of traditional monitoring
protocols such as NetFlow/IPFIX and sFlow with the SDN protocol, OpenFlow,
have been explored [85, 222].
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Prior work has aimed to tackle the challenges of monitoring at scale. For
example, FlowSense [218] uses a push-based approach to receive flow statis-
tics from switches. Adaptive rate monitoring has also been introduced; Open-
NetMon [207] and OpenTM [204] poll selected switches at an adaptive rate
to reduce network and switch CPU overhead. PayLess [43] uses an adaptive
sampling algorithm to vary polling frequency based on measured throughput.
Similarly, FlowCover [188] reduces the monitoring communication cost by op-
timizing the polling function. OpenMeasure [115] uses online learning to adapt
flow measurement. This enables scalable measurement with monitoring of the
most informative flows and optimal placement of monitoring rules across multi-
ple switches. Proxy-based Monitoring [195] introduces a monitoring table in the
proxy to specify the measurement interval for traﬃc monitoring and associated
flow rules are pushed to the OpenFlow switches. Flow-stats-requests/replies
are then only exchanged for those specified monitored flows rather than all
flows. This reduces the volume of statistics communication in a similar fash-
ion to OpenTAM [150], which is an ONOS-specific adaptive monitoring tool.
However, there are several identified limitations to the work; packet capture per-
formance is limited to 60Mbps, the system is limited to 600 condition entries
(i.e. rules for capture/monitoring) and it is based on OpenFlow 1.0.
In FlowRadar [114], the authors address the challenge of monitoring in data
centers where the existing NetFlow implementation options are unsuitable either
due to the prohibitive cost of high-end routers (hardware-based) or excessive
switch CPU resource requirements (software-based). The FlowRadar solution is
to balance the workload by encoding per-flow counters with low memory require-
ment and constant insertion time at switches. The decoding and analysis of the
flow counters is then performed at the remote collector where there is available
computation resource. FlowRadar provides a scalable solution for network-wide
monitoring across the data centre independent of SDN or OpenFlow.
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In contrast, with [189, 190], the authors propose to use only OpenFlow
messages and capabilities within SDN to emulate NetFlow in traditional net-
works. This works by randomly sampling the traﬃc and maintaining per-flow
statistics in separated records that are then reported to the collector. Three
diﬀerent flow-sampling based methods are proposed; ip-suﬃx based, port-based
and hash-based (5-tuple). The evaluation shows that the hash-based method
achieves the best results in terms of matching the theoretical maximum flows
sampled while reducing controller communication and controlling the number
of entries installed at the switch.
SDN Mon [157] seeks to improve on monitoring application granularity with
an SDN monitoring framework that separates the monitoring logic from the
forwarding logic. SDN-Mon achieves monitoring in a similar way to that is
proposed in this thesis, by using multiple tables to separate monitoring and
forwarding. However, these tables are not OpenFlow tables, but instead are
situated within an application that sits on a customised version of the Lagopus
software switch. As such, SDN-Mon only works with this switch. UMON
[213] also addresses the separation of forwarding and monitoring logic. This
is achieved by introducing an additional monitoring table at the end of the
forwarding pipeline. New monitoring actions are also introduced to support
statistics collection on non-routing fields such as, SYN, ACK etc. This enables,
for example, port scan detection based on fine-grained monitoring. However,
the implementation is specific to OpenvSwitch.
Most recently, Tsai et al. [205] present an overview of SDN monitoring
solutions identifying the challenges and open issues. The research developments
are classified according to the monitoring phase, i.e. collection, preprocessing,
transmission, analysis, and presentation, with the majority of research focused
in the preprocessing phase. This includes solutions such as OpenSketch [219]
and OpenTM [204] detailed above. With respect to integrating monitoring
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in hybrid environments with legacy network devices, the benefit of solutions
leveraging sFlow is highlighted. A number of items are identified as open issues.
OpenMeasure [115] is an example of an adaptive measurement approach but
without consideration of resource usage or the use of the measurement data for
security functions. Leveraging monitoring and data collection to detect security
threats is also identified as an area for further work with the importance of
multi-domain collaborative network monitoring also highlighted.
Research from Tangari et al. [193, 194], develops on the algorithm behind
adapting OpenFlow flow statistics reports in order to achieve eﬃcient monitor-
ing under intensive network load. On top of this, they also observe the benefit
of decentralising and tiering control of SDN for improved monitoring scalability.
2.1.3.2 SDN Security Frameworks
In cutting edge large scale enterprise network deployments, typically a systems
such as [96, 31, 138] are deployed to monitor, traﬃc on the network and enforce
network policy. The following details academic and industrial SDN security
frameworks that fill a similar gap.
The first protection architecture for SDN was proposed in [37], prior to the
development of the OpenFlow protocol. Since the introduction of OpenFlow,
various research from both academia and industry [181, 41, 89, 90, 104] has
focused on taking advantage of the characteristics of SDN for intrusion detection
and prevention services.
FRESCO [181] is a framework that focuses on providing a platform for rapid
design and development of security specific modules as OpenFlow applications;
it claims that popular security functions can be created with 90% fewer lines
of code. At the core of its design it hosts a self-named "security kernel", which
supports multiple security modules that can run alongside each other without
conflict.
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CIPA [41] applies an artificial neural networks across OF-SDN switches for
the detection of distributed, coordinated intrusion attacks such as scanning,
worm outbreak and DDoS. The false positive/detection rate and communication
overhead are all shown as improvements over Gamer’s [84] anomaly detection
solution.
With [89] and [90], Ha et al. consider intrusion detection in SDNs. In [89], a
flow grouping scheme is proposed to determine which flows to forward to which
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to achieve the best intrusion detection per-
formance. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [100] is used for grouping the
suspicious flows and gravity-based clustering is used to assign these groups to
IDSs. In the example results, each of the network taps feed into an aggregation
switch from which the assignment to IDSs is made.
In [90], the authors present results for optimising the sampling rate for each
switch to improve inspection performance of malicious traﬃc in large networks.
The sampling rate adjustment is designed to fully utilise the inspection capa-
bility of the malicious traﬃc while keeping the total volume of sampled traﬃc
below the maximum processing capacity of the IDS. However, the malicious
traﬃc rate must be estimated to begin with and can then converge to the ac-
tual value based on the adjusted sampling frequency. The selection of optimal
rate would strongly influence the convergence time. Simulation results showed
that the algorithm converged in about 100 s for the smaller network, which is
somewhat impractical.
SDN4S [104] is proposed as a system and solution to minimise the time be-
tween incident detection and resolution by using automated countermeasures
based on SDN. The system creates incident-specific response work-flows that
automatically implement actions and network countermeasures. The work is
motivated by the challenge of managing an increasing volume of network threats
and hence security alerts, with limited resources to analyse and respond to these
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alerts. The solution is based on the concept of playbooks, which match/tailor
the security incident response to a high level policy. SDN4S has holds simi-
larities with the work in this thesis; for example, there is a similar component
architecture, the ability to receive alerts from external security systems, and
the OpenFlow-based network protection mechanism. However, although the
motivation of SDN4S is to minimise response time, there is no evaluation of the
response time or of the eﬀectiveness of the detection/protection mechanisms.
PSI [221] is proposed as a new enterprise network security architecture to
address the challenge of existing enterprise security approaches lacking precise
defences in isolation, context, and agility. The authors describe these as follows:
for isolation, the defence system must ensure that security policies do not in-
terfere with each other; for context, the defence system must be able to enforce
customised policies for individual network devices, and for agility, the defence
system must be able to change policy at fine-grained time-scales. PSI and this
thesis address a similar set of problems related to usable network security; that
of appropriate, eﬃcient network security. Both systems achieve this by lever-
aging SDN and NFV. PSI emphasises the use of NFV with the tunneling of
all network traﬃc through a cluster of virtualised appliances within which the
relevant services are applied to the traﬃc. In contrast, this thesis emphasises
the use of SDN. Rather than tunneling all traﬃc through a cluster (albeit vir-
tual and hence flexibly deployed), this thesis leverages the SDN switch design
to eﬀectively apply security policy in the data plane through the selection of
traﬃc for monitoring at diﬀerent granularities. This results in flows being con-
servatively mirrored (rather than redirected), reducing overall network load and
latency for benign traﬃc. Additionally, unlike PSI, the use of IPFIX and sFlow
provides visibility in legacy networks.
Finally, Athena [112] is an SDN anomaly detection framework. Athena
addresses the issue of scalability across large, distributed SDN deployments.
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The framework supports the development of machine-learning based security
applications with two scenarios illustrated; DDoS detection and Link Flooding
Attack mitigation. However, Athena does not support interoperability. Further-
more, Athena does not oﬀer adaptive measurement for resource optimisation.
Public information on industrial eﬀorts towards creating an SDN security
framework is limited. In late 2018 Corsa released a product called Red Ar-
mor [52], this commercial solution to network security uses OpenFlow to secure
the network. Due to the product’s infancy, there are no results on showing its
capability, performance, or usefulness. This said, Corsa’s recent hardware is
unique as it oﬀers a virtualisation resource on the switch. This means that the
switch is capable of more taxing security and monitoring use cases, including
encryption and Deep Packet Inspection.
2.1.4 Network Functions Virtualisation
NFV moves away from the traditional networking paradigm, decoupling soft-
ware from hardware, making it possible to run packet processing logic elsewhere
as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) [118]. This is made possible with the
flexibility provided by Software Defined Networking (SDN), which separates
the control and forwarding planes and enables programmability of the control
plane, allowing networking hardware to be controlled remotely. These new
concepts yield many benefits for ISPs which were originally only available to
Cloud providers; network functions can be run in a variety of locations, scaled
automatically, managed remotely, and chained together. This ’softwarisation’
of networks can benefit both customers and ISPs, with reductions in the lead-
time for new services, lower capital and operational costs and savings in power
consumption [6].
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Realising NFV is challenging and requires automation to simplify the pro-
cess. To aid this, ETSI created a specification called Management And Orches-
tration (MANO), which is a specification for an architecture that details a view
of how NFV could be realised [70]. This architecture provides control of NFV-
Infrastructures (NFVIs) to operators through multiple layers of abstraction.
More recently, Verizon (and others) have advanced the MANO architecture
with an SDN-NFV specification [210], this is significant because it connects the
interfaces between the MANO system and the network infrastructure, which in
turn creates a complete solution for deploying NFV in the Cloud. Currently
the amalgamation of designs are primarily made for Cloud architectures which
typically include homogeneous highly connected servers. Generally, these are
extensions to Cloud Management (CM) tools [122] such as OpenStack [175].
2.2 Emerging Computing Architectures
In the ever-changing landscape of the Internet, following the success of Cloud
computing the concept of Fog Computing, first coined by Flavio Bonomi at
Cisco [25, 208] has recently emerged. It describes an environment where there
is distributed compute and storage located between the cloud and the end point,
bringing the functionality of the Cloud closer to the target in a variety compute
locations known as Cloudlets [168], Micro-Clouds [68], or Nano-Datacenters
[108]. These Fog locations can include a range of devices from low-powered Cus-
tomer Premises Equipment (CPEs) at the edge of the network, servers within
telephone exchanges, through to network devices within the ISP core. Compa-
rable to the history of programmable networks, principles behind the concept of
Fog computing have existed before under diﬀerent names; the Fog is similar to
the previously defined and less popular term The Mist [55] and complementary
to the recently defined Dew computing [184]. Since the concept of Fog emerged
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in 2012, two significant developments have taken place:
1) Cisco IOx is an advancement of Cisco’s work with IoT analytics [129, 57],
and is now a propriety Fog platform for interfacing with the Internet of Things
(IoT). In its current state, the platform oﬀers a method for deploying abstract
policies to IOx compatible Cisco networking devices to create low cost alerts
for IoT devices.
2) OpenFog reference architecture created by the OpenFog Consortium is
the first reference architecture for the Fog [50]. The primary contribution being
their description of multiple pillars required to make the Fog work. OpenFog
also highlights that the Fog is multi-purpose and can be used as a service to
devices on the network such as IoT, or as a service to controlling the Network.
With the increased general compute capability at each point in the Internet,
the Fog can be used to provide a low latency highly scalable infrastructure for
NFV [208]. However, when using Network Functions Virtualisation to provide
networking services, the current solution is to deploy services on resource-rich,
homogeneous, centralised, and well maintained servers within cloud data cen-
tres [123]. This contrasts with the Fog, where compute resides within a variety
of locations with little to no maintenance and heterogeneous resources.
Various research eﬀorts from ONLabs [155, 156] and multiple Universi-
ties [30, 167, 185] have already been conducted into NFV-MANO solutions
hosted outside of the cloud datacentre in locations such as the operator’s edge
with the purpose to virtualise the customer network functions. Collectively,
these papers motivate the need to move away from Cloud computing by high-
lighting a major challenge of NFV-MANO, which is creating an infrastructure
that can scale to run millions of VNFs [123]. However, the above solutions
solve challenges of NFV orchestration by creating a new infrastructure and not
considering what other Fog future infrastructures may contain. NFV is not
intended to require a clean slate installation, it aims to be a gradual change
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between existing infrastructures. This deployment will include installation into
many heterogeneous environments [122].
Further impacting NFV deployment to the Fog is that many current at-
tempts at making NFV systems [38, 34] run each network function in its own
virtual machine, this is done to simplify orchestration and to make sure that
each VNF is isolated. However, this is wasteful; depending on the VNF in use,
a significant amount of the compute resource is consumed by the host operating
system rather than the VNF. Recent maturity of containerisation can reduce
the performance impact and overall cost of running VNFs verses additional
VMs [11]. Multi-tenancy can be used to further conserve compute resource
by running multiple VNFs on one machine, or even in a single process. How-
ever, this complicates management and orchestration, and means that VNFs
can aﬀect each other, potentially sharing fate if one goes down. As well as this,
Unikernels have been oﬀering a diﬀerent solution to conservative virtualisation,
creating an operating system with only the dependencies required for its func-
tion [116]. More recently, a proof of concept has been made using Unikernels
for NFV [214]. However, the performance benefits versus the complexity of
creation is still unclear [28].
With these diﬀerent visions on how the future internet will look with mixed
compute capabilities at diﬀerent NFVI-PoPs, there is no single place where all
the compute resource resides. It is clear that there needs to be an orchestrator
that is agnostic of what the future internet contains but also takes into consider-
ation the capabilities of each NFVI. Highlighted by the findings in this section,
there are a number of challenges that need to be addressed before the concepts
of Fog computing and NFV can be brought together, including the unsuitability
of current management platforms, the unique heterogeneity of resources and a
volatility in the availability of such.
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2.3 Management and Orchestration
One of the primary benefits of using programmable networks is the reduction of
Operational Expenditure (OPEX), this is in part achieved through automation
and orchestration [71, 93].
To realise NFV, innovative network service design and deployments are re-
quired. Progress has been made towards this goal in both academia and in-
dustry. Most eﬀorts in this area have centred around designing a solution for
managing and orchestrating NFV in the Cloud [72, 49], arguably the most
influential work is ETSI’s NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO) spec-
ification [71]. However, various other research eﬀorts including, [69], have high-
lighted the benefits of running NFV services closer to the target (anything
directly benefiting from the service) and from the requirements of applications
like these, the concept of Fog computing has emerged.
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Figure 2.6: ETSI’s NFV Framework Design Architecture
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2.3.1 Management and Orchestration Standardisation
As MANOs mature, it is imperative that standardisation is used so that frame-
work components are compatible with one another. In the area of MANO
standards, there are have been many competing standards. ETSI is the first
standards institution to explore the applicability of the NFV paradigm in op-
erator infrastructures and to develop Proof of Concept implementations. Fur-
thermore, as pictured in Figure 2.6 ETSI leads the design of the well known
NFV MANO architecture [118]. NFV standardisation is not limited to ETSI,
and other standardisation bodies, like the IETF NFVRG charter [132], the
Open Platform for NFV (OPNFV) industrial forum [160] and the TM Forum’s
ZOOM, develop MANO reference implementations and propose extensions to
the MANO architecture.
The MANO specifications abstract the control of virtualised infrastructures
and VNF instances to external entities, like the OSS/BSS and the service or-
chestrator of an operator. ETSI’s MANO is currently the most popular NFV
management framework, with numerous open-source and commercial imple-
mentations. Operators explore the adoption of MANO compatible manage-
ments systems for various compounding reasons. Firstly, NFV MANO is a flex-
ible component-based architecture which re-uses existing infrastructure man-
agement frameworks, like SDN Network Operating Systems and the OpenStack
framework. Therefore, existing components can be extended by vendors, simpli-
fying the development of NFV platforms. Secondly, the maturity and relatively
detailed specification of the MANO components enable seamless interoperabil-
ity between implementations from diﬀerent vendors. Thirdly, the architecture
provides by-design multiple carrier-grade features, like scalable hierarchical con-
trol, billing, and flexible service and function lifecycle specification.
Integration between the diﬀerent functional components of the ETSI archi-
tecture is achieved through reference points, a distributed information plane
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that models state updates and control operations. The root element of the
information plane is the Network Service (NS), which represents the service
chain of a service. A NS consists of one or more Virtual Network Functions
(VNF), like firewalls or load balancers, connected using Virtual Links (VL),
while a VNF Forwarding Graph (VNFFG) defines VNF ordering. Furthermore,
a NS may include Physical Network Functions (PNF), available in the under-
lying network infrastructure. Finally, the MANO information model defines
data repositories of NS templates, VNF catalogues, and NFVI resources, which
simplify the specification and deployment of a NS.
Alongside ETSI’s MANO architecture, the MEF has been steering the stan-
dardisation eﬀorts for the MEF Lifecycle Service Orchestration (LSO) [120],
which is an architecture that focuses on improving automation in network ser-
vice management. MEF extends the MANO architecture and introduces sup-
port for end-to-end network infrastructure management, capitalising on the
flexible control of CE technologies. LSO targets challenges of delivering Net-
work as a Service (NaaS) functionalities in the operator infrastructure, such as
on-demand, agility, and heterogeneity of virtual and physical NFs. LSO refines
the service lifecycle model of the MANO standards and introduce new lifecycle
capabilities, including mechanisms to automate network service request fulfil-
ment, control of service resource and scaling, enhanced performance monitor
and guarantees and assurances for service survivability. Based on [120] LSO
aims to improve the time to establish and modify services for their future Inter-
net vision. The development of the LSO standards is still in early stages and it
currently focuses on service requirement specification in order to drive the ar-
chitecture design. The following paragraphs detail ESTI’s MANO architecture
as well as various NFV forwarding technologies.
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Virtualised Infrastructure Manager (VIM) The VIM provides direct
control and monitoring capabilities for a single NFV Infrastructure (NFVI)
domain to the upper layers of the MANO architecture. VIM responsibilities
include the management of the compute, network, and storage resources of a
datacenter and it exposes interfaces for resource control and VNF image man-
agement. Current implementations re-use existing Cloud Management Systems
(CMS), such as OpenStack, to realize the VIM layer. Nonetheless, the de-
sign goals of existing CMSs cannot accommodate some VIM requirements, like
carrier-grade support, high-performance I/O, and fine-grain and timely resource
control. Currently, OPNFV [160], in collaboration with ETSI, designs and de-
velops new open-source VIM and infrastructure virtualisation platforms, that
bridge this requirement gap.
Virtual Network Function Manager (VNFM) The VNFM sits between
the NFVO and the VIM systems and is responsible for the lifecycle manage-
ment of individual VNF instances, including VNF configuration, monitoring,
termination, and scaling. VNF management is typically realized using an El-
ement Manager (EMS), which monitors and reports the state of each VNF to
the VNFM and is capable to modify the configuration of the VNF. The de-
ployment of an NFVM is not mandatory according to the MANO specifications
and the functionality of this layer can be implemented by the NFV orchestra-
tor. Current MANO frameworks either lack an NFVM or develop a very thin
adaptation layer between the NFV orchestrator and the VIM, responsible to
propagate VNF image deployment requests. Nonetheless, a VNFM can enable
seamless interoperability between VNF implementations from diﬀerent vendors
and across cloud infrastructures.
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Network Functions Virtualisation Orchestrator (NFVO) The NFVO
is responsible for the deployment and dynamic re-optimisation of network ser-
vices. Eﬀectively, the NFVO receives NS requests from external entities, like
the OSS and the service orchestrator, and coordinates the deployment and con-
figuration of VNF instances across the NFVI domains. In parallel, the NFVO
monitor the service performance and dynamically re-optimises the deployment
of VNF instance to meet the NS requirements. When creating a new NS,
the NFVO optimises placement of VNFs whilst ensuring suﬃcient resources
and connectivity are available. Current NFVO implementations provide a thin
layer capable of launching and destroying VNF chains across the NFVI domains
of the operator and provide limited support for dynamic reoptimisation of the
service deployment.
On top of standards around the general architecture of NFV, there are stan-
dardisation eﬀorts around traﬃc routing within an NFV architecture. As this
thesis makes use of NFV, understanding the surrounding NFV forwarding tech-
nologies and solutions is important. The following looks into three forwarding
technologies, Service Function Chaining, Segment Routing, and a Network Ser-
vice header as solutions for NFV routing and redirection.
Service Function Chaining (SFC) SFC [91] is an IETF working group as
well as an architecture which both aim to define the architectural principles
and protocols for the deployment and management of NF forwarding graphs.
An SFC deployment operates as a network overlay, logically separating the
control plane of the service from the control of the underlying network. The
overlay functionality is implemented by specialised forwarding elements, using
a new network header. At the time of writing, multiple open-source platforms
introduce SFC support. The Open vSwitch soft-switch has introduced SFC
support both in the data and the control (OpenFlow extensions) plane. The
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OpenStack cloud management platform exploits the Open vSwitch SFC support
and implements a high-level SFC control interface [176].
Segment Routing (SR) Segment Routing [80] is an architecture for the
instantiation of service graphs over a network infrastructure using source rout-
ing mechanisms, specified by the IETF Source Packet Routing in Networking
(SPRING) WG [159]. SR is a data plane technology and uses existing protocols
to store instructions (segments) for the packet path in its header. SR segments
can have local or global semantics, and the architecture defines three segments
types: a node segment forwards a packet over the shortest path towards a net-
work node, an adjacency segment forwards the packet through a specific router
port and a service segment introduces service diﬀerentiation on a service path.
Next Generation Service Overlay Networks (NGSON) NGSON [111]
is an IEEE standardisation eﬀort [97] that allows for the establishment of dy-
namic services across diﬀerent service providers. It boasts support for context-
aware services chains that enhance the network Quality of Experience.
Network Service Header (NSH) NSH [161] is an encapsulation technique
for forwarding traﬃc to NFV clusters and through service chains. The Network
Service Header contains information that defines the position of a packet in
the service path, using a service path and path index identifiers, and carries
metadata between service functions regarding policy and post-service delivery.
At the time of writing, NSH is not widely used due to it having no support or
implementation in networking hardware.
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2.3.2 NFV Management and Orchestration Implemen-
tations
The following section details the state of art NFV MANO implementations. As
MANO and NFV are relatively new concepts, the following implementations are
relatively immature and in most cases incomplete and not production ready.
Cloudify [48] was initially built as a generic Cloud orchestrator, but has
more recently shifted its focus towards NFV, adopting specifications and stan-
dards from the ETSI MANO, YANG and TOSCA groups. Cloudify acts as an
overlay framework over various technologies. It oﬀers a multi-VIM hybrid ap-
proach for managing the Cloud, assuming that system operators may have more
than one type of infrastructure that they want to control. Furthermore, it sup-
ports deep integration with various existing tools, including those responsible
for automation, containerisation, and orchestration. Cloudify also has optional
agentless support, broadening support further. However, this mode somewhat
limits Cloudifys lifecycle management.
Open Source MANO (OSM) [72] works alongside the ETSI MANO spec-
ification and is based on an earlier project, OpenMANO. By default it uses
OpenVIM, but this is changeable for other VIMs, including OpenStack. OSM
orchestrates instances of OpenMANO, doing so through the RIFT.io project.
This manages distributed MANOs to provide NFV capabilities at scale.
OpenBaton [35] is a product of the OpenSDNCore project and is built up
to be an ETSI-compliant MANO. It has support for all of the components in
the ETSI specification. The software supports OpenStack as an infrastructure.
The Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) within OpenBaton is separate com-
ponent to the core so that it can be swapped out for alternative VIMs. Agents
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are used within VMs as part of the service package to execute and monitor the
services.
ONAP [135] is a merge of Open-O and ECOMP [143] and is under the
Linux foundation. It is an NFV-MANO framework uses ODL and OpenStack
to oﬀer orchestration and lifecycle monitoring. ONAP’s main benefit over other
orchestrators is collaboration with other partners and its data centric approach
to orchestration [136].
ZOOM [203] is part of the TM Forum and focuses on research and stan-
dardisation of Zero-touch orchestration and management. The project has a
particular focus around support for hybrid networks and design of future net-
work operations systems.
SONATA [66] is an NFV framework that provides a suite of tools in a SDK
to oﬀer a DevOps-enabled service platform and orchestration system.
T-NOVA [216] is a MANO for provisioning of Network Functions as a ser-
vice (NFaaS). Its primary focus is around NFaaS where the orchestrator uses
a Network Function marketplace where network functions can be bought and
sold between vendors and operators.
OpenContrail [182, 45] is an NFV solution based on OpenStack which
focuses on achieving forwarding data plane traﬃc to NFV clusters using network
tunnels and BGP to route traﬃc.
CloudNFV [49] is an orchestration platform with SDN functionality. It’s
primary selling point is that it uses a unified management with orchestration in
a single data model. This relies on OpenStack as the VIM.
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OpenVIM [151] focuses on the VIM layer of the ESTI MANO architecture,
providing features not available in current cloud management systems that are
relevant to NFV. On top of this, it also oﬀers a lighter weight solution to virtual
machine management than OpenStack [173].
CORD [154] is a MANO based on the use of compute resources within the
datacenter so that NFV can be placed somewhat closer to the edge of the
network. Furthermore CORD oﬀers a full stack solution that makes use of the
SDN controller ONOS.
Open Platform for NFV (OPNFV) [160] is a project focusing on provid-
ing carrier-grade NFV, and moving standards forward. The lower infrastructure
management layers have received the most attention, as to build a strong foun-
dation. OPNFV currently has no orchestration layer and therefore cannot be
used on its own, but oﬀers a basis to start or be used in conjunction with an-
other MANO. The current VIM supports OpenStack, but support for ARM
architectures is likely forthcoming as part of the ARM-Band project.
2.3.3 Container Management and Orchestration Imple-
mentations
Unlike systems based on ETSI’s MANO architecture, container orchestration
tools are not typically designed with NFV as the primary use case. Rather, they
are intended to help Cloud operators manage their infrastructure and to help
developers deploy and scale services more easily. Since these are also important
features required in a Fog scenario, they warrant consideration in this context
too. Furthermore, because they have existed for longer and have a broader
purpose, these projects are generally more mature oﬀering more features and
greater stability.
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Kubernetes [107] is a container orchestration tool originally designed by
Google to automate operation, scale, and deployment of containers across a
cluster of machines. As well as deploying services, Kubernetes has a major
focus on maintaining the services that it deploys, with policies for automatic
scaling and failover. In order for a master to control the workers a client must be
installed on each worker node. These software components are compatible with
both ARM and x86 architectures. As of 2019, a sub-project under Kubernetes
named KubeEdge has been announced [106] that specifically aims to address
the challenges of applying Kubernetes to edge networks.
Swarm [63] is a native clustering tool for Docker which now comes packaged
with the Docker engine. It uses the Docker remote API to manage and run
containers on multiple hosts. It also uses an agent on each host which is man-
aged by a single Swarm manager. Swarms orchestration consists of clustering;
it makes a group of Docker hosts appear as a single machine. Services are run
from the manager machine and are served to the Swarm workers.
Fleet [83] is a cluster management tool from CoreOS that acts as a founda-
tion layer for other higher layer container orchestration solutions. Fleet is built
upon the Linux init system, specifically systemd, which is responsible for ini-
tialising and managing services. Fleet extends this functionality across a cluster
of machines. In order to use Fleet, agents (the CoreOS operating system) must
be installed on all hosts.
MESOS [12] is a cluster management tool that provides a distributed sys-
tems kernel abstraction: it clusters a group of servers and makes them appear
as one. MESOS is designed to work at large scale with examples including thou-
sands of hosts. Similar to Fleet, MESOS oﬀers management of the lower layers,
but also supports the higher layer orchestration through Platform-as-a-Service
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(PaaS) solutions such as Mesosphere Marathon. To use MESOS there must be
a master node, and agents must be installed on the workers.
Rancher [162] is a container management platform from Rancher Labs that
oﬀers orchestration through a framework called Cattle. It is a fork from Swarm
and thus oﬀers similar orchestration capabilities. As well as this, Rancher sup-
ports MESOS, Swarm, and Kubernetes.
Mirantis [127] Recently Mirantis have created MCP Edge [126] which specif-
ically aims at deploying from the core to the edge of the network. This aims
to oﬀer production grade cloud control over the edge of the network, providing
the usual benefits such as system monitoring and support for CI/CD.
Some of these tools oﬀer more complete solutions to NFV and orchestration
than others. When considering which is appropriate, it is important to note
that when using a complete solution, extending or adapting the design can be
challenge. On the other hand, when using general or half-stack solutions, there
is greater flexibility for the design of a new system and architecture. As the
relative youth of NFV, most of these solutions are missing features required
for deployment. One of theses being VNF forwarding graphs. Some have this
in concept but production ready standardised implementations do not exist.
The OpenStack consortium has a work in progress solution of this [149] so they
may be waiting for that to be finished. On top of this, these orchestrators are
typically designed with the notion that the resource is going to be physically
homogeneous and networked similarly and thus are not well suited for Fog based
environments.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter has detailed background and related work around scalable network
monitoring, NFV, and computing towards the edge. Several pieces of work
have been identified on their relevance towards to the aim of this thesis. With
the objective to design and verify a scalable and responsive monitoring system
in mind, the current technologies of SDN NFV and Orchestration currently
lack the features to fully achieve this. As a result further research in edge
orchestration, scalablity, and monitoring is required before this thesis can be
realised. This said, best practices and failures of past research can help in
directing this work.
The technologies and research gaps have been highlighted that are required
to realise scalable and monitoring responsive monitoring for the Cloud-to-Fog
continuum. It is clear that work is required on advancing NFV service over-
lays, edge VNF orchestration, SDN monitoring methodology, and connections
between these technologies. Specifically, background and related work have
detailed:
• The potential benefits of SDN, NFV, and Fog Computing for network
monitoring and remediation
• The lack of SDN monitoring frameworks that focus on scalability and
adaptability whilst still retaining monitoring capability
• The lack of standardised and usable solutions for traﬃc routing between
virtualisation and network infrastructures
• The limited research on the potential for scalablity and function of a
framework that considers monitoring across the network
Finally, the findings from this chapter including existing tools, standards,
and observed successful practicalities from related research are considered in
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 41
the design and implementation of both the Siren and Tennison frameworks





This chapter describes a design for a responsive and scalable network moni-
toring systems. Initially, Section 3.1 goes into detail on why a new design is
required, highlighting gaps in current systems, as well as advantages of emerg-
ing technologies. Based on the motivations discussed, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 go
into detail on the design requirements as well as design considerations, covering
topics of SDN scalability, monitoring, and orchestration methodology.
In summary, this chapter details the motivations, requirements, design con-
siderations, and architecture for components of a novel SDN network monitoring
system: Tennison, as well as a Cloud-to-Fog orchestration system: Siren.
3.1 Motivation
There is a growing trend towards highly configurable networks and services.
Achieved through the movement of packet processing functionality into soft-
ware [118], this progress enables network providers to dynamically adapt their
provision in response to varying demand. Thus far, focus has been primarily on
data centre and cloud environments. More recently, interest has shifted towards
access and last-mile networks, encapsulating telephone exchanges, homes and
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business environments in the process [154, 217, 25]. This complete spectrum
of networks and devices is called the Fog [25]. When combined with Network
Functions Virtualisation (NFV), the Fog presents a number of interesting op-
portunities for network operators: services can now be pushed even closer to
the edge of networks, and in some cases, only a single hop away from the target
devices. In conjunction with existing capabilities, this new enhancement allows
for greater performance and eﬃciency, regardless of the type of service to be
deployed. The potential benefits are best described through use of an example.
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) store and host replica copies of content,
primarily multimedia. These are then used to serve consumer requests, rather
than retrieving the content from the origin server. In current networks, these
content replicas are located in centralised strategic locations, such as Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs). Yet there are still a number of network hops to reach
the final destination, which may ultimately be located in the users home or
place of work. CDNs exist primarily to improve the experience given to the
user. Despite current deployment strategies, these final hops can nonetheless
have an impact on the service delivered. In a Fog scenario, it would be possible
to locate and serve content within the last-mile network, or even within the
users local network. This reduces the chance of network impairment impacting
user experience.
3.1.1 The Cloud-to-Fog Continuum
The Cloud-to-Fog continuum as shown in Figure 3.1 describes an Internet com-
pute architecture where compute resource for NFV is available all the way from
the datacenter to the residence and enterprise locations. Current NFV sys-
tems [72, 135, 48] as well as the ETSI NFV specification [70] rely on the use of
Cloud for the infrastructure. Whilst there are advantages to running NFV in
the Cloud such as scale and ease of management, the network edge also provides


























Figure 3.1: Cloud to Fog Continuum
advantages due to proximity as detailed in Section 2.2. As highlighted by the
Fog specification [50] from the Open Fog Consortium [88] the Fog is a fertile
ground for NFV deployment.
This thesis claims that by considering the spectrum of environments capable
of hosting compute resources, benefits can be reaped from each such that deploy-
ment and placement of virtualised network services can be done eﬃciently [75,
74].
3.1.1.1 Analysis of SDN/NFV Performance in Edge Networks
Key to enabling deployment across the Cloud-to-Fog continuum is low power,
cheap, small form factor, and reliable resources that can be distributed across
the network. The following section analyses how such devices have improved
over the last 25 years.
Along with the increased interest in deploying to the edge, is the increase in
resources at reduced cost. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show an analysis of 3,870 CPEs
sold between 1998–2019 demonstrates the upward trend in device capabilities,
such that they can now reasonably be considered as compute hosts as a Fog-
NFVI, the devices clearly diﬀer vastly in their capabilities relative to those
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Alongside the growing compute capability, ARM have been actively tar-
geting NFV and SDN with their low power processor architecture [13]. They
are approaching NFV with a micro-service based architecture, knowing that
network services are split up into multiple separate components, they are pro-
ducing high processor count chipsets, which can cleanly delegate resources to
each service component [13].
3.1.1.2 Experimentation Environment
Demonstrating the use of considering the context in the Fog, Figure 3.4 shows
the simple experiment topology that is representing two home networks that
share an aggregate switch to the Internet. This case study compares the cost to
the network in three scenarios: 1) a vCache VNF being deployed using a first fit
clustering policy 2) a vCache VNF being deployed using an context-optimised
policy and 3) using no CDN and requesting video directly from content provider
source. The vCache is deployed to the NFVI (Raspberry Pi) as a Docker con-
tainer. The video in use for the case study is a 1080p version of the Big Buck
Bunny standard testing video and is 276.1MB in size. During each experiment
iteration, three clients are watching the video and traﬃc is being monitored and
recorded on the aggregate switch to evaluate the diﬀerence between deployment
1https://github.com/lyndon160/cpe-scraper
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techniques. In the in second test, where optimised placement is used, the con-
tent provider requests information about latency between the service customers









Figure 3.4: Experimentation Topology
3.1.1.3 Analysis of Fog Placement
Figure 3.5 shows the results of three VNF placement techniques. The stacked
bar chart shows live data, which is data that was pulled over the aggregate
switch whilst clients were watching the video, and pre-pushed data, which is
the cost of pushing the vCache VNF.

























Figure 3.5: Fog Placement Cost Reduction
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In this instance, the contextual information has made it so that the VNF
can be placed much closer to the client on NFVI B, thus reducing observed
traﬃc on the aggregate switch by two thirds when compared to no caching.
More importantly, a suboptimal placement policy such as first fit which in
this instance places the VNF on NFVI A can cost more to the network when
compared with no caching, this is due to the VNF being pushed whilst the
content being requested over the aggregate switch.
This concurs with similar work in the area of edge optimisation; In a mobile
messaging use case, it has been shown that pushing services to the edge can
reduce traﬃc up to 50% [69].
3.1.1.4 Limitations of Scalability and Distribution within Contem-
porary Solutions and Technologies
In order to realise an SDN monitoring framework that can be deployed from
the Cloud-to-Fog, aspects of scalablity and distribution need to be addressed
within SDN and NFV. The following reviews diﬀerent aspects required for such
a framework and their components that do not match up to the requirements.
SDN Controller Scale: ONOS has limitations around scale [76, 137]. As
shown in ONOS’s own performance tests [137], over version releases, the con-
troller is improving but it’s clear that its scalability is still limited. To add to
this, SDN monitoring requires additional switch to controller messaging, which
further impacts scalablity.
VNF Forwarding: In order to redirect traﬃc from the network to and NFV
infrastructure a forwarding methodology outside of standard routing is required.
In current cloud based NFV solution this is solved with a network choke-point
that redirects traﬃc in and out of the NFV cluster. The complexity of this
increases when deploying across to distributed NFVIs where there is no single
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point in the network where all traﬃc traverses. At the time of writing, there is
no widely integrated VNF forwarding graph technology. The closest to this is
the Network Service Header (NSH), which serves this purpose but is currently
does not have a production grade implementation.
NFV Deployment to Heterogeneous Environments: NFV deployments
thus far are not concerned with specific deployment details. In order to de-
ploy from the Cloud-to-Fog continuum an orchestrator needs to be aware of the
network topology and the infrastructure topology. Cloud management plat-
forms are also not concerned with specific placement of VMs/Containers. The
closest is Kubernetes which allows each machine to have a label which can be
used to determine its location. Solutions like this go against the ethos of this
tool, where resources are homogeneous and containers can be dropped on any
machine regardless of its context.
3.1.2 Summary
This section has motivated the need to use edge computing to increase the
scale of NFV deployments, specifically when considering network monitoring.
Furthermore, this section has highlighted multiple research challenges that need
to be addressed before a scalable monitoring system operating across the Cloud-
to-Fog continuum can be realised.
The following summarises the challenges that need to be addressed in order
to fulfil the goals of this thesis as detailed in Section 1.4. Improving scale of SDN
controllers with controller distribution and tiering. Designing and prototyping
a forwarding technology capable of dynamically routing traﬃc to distributed
NFVIs. Finally, this section has motivated the need to extend the Cloud to the
network edge, thus considering heterogeneous environments in NFV orchestra-
tion is required.
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In summary, there needs to be an architecture that includes SDN and NFV
that is capable of integrating network monitoring across the network rather
than a single point in the Cloud.
3.2 High Level Design Requirements
Elicited from background research and current research challenges in network
monitoring as highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2, the following details the high
level design requirements for a responsive and scalable network monitoring sys-
tem.
• A wide a range of inputs should be supported such that the system can
best understand the state of the network.
• Place monitoring based network functions towards the edge of the network
to optimise use of the network.
• Monitoring that is conscious of network capacity and is capable of pro-
portionally adapting to the context.
• Extenisbility so that additions such as an operator interface and new
detection algorithms can be integrated with ease.
• Monitoring should be able to adapt to network capacity such that the
network controller, data plane, and monitoring system are not overloaded.
The design requirements above provide an overview of the directions of re-
search required to successfully design and implement a scalable network moni-
toring system.
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3.3 Design Considerations
This section details various design considerations for monitoring and orches-
tration in the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. Specifically, this section compares the
available technologies and solutions to monitoring agility and control, moni-
toring, deployment flexibility, network service orchestration, virtualisation, and
technology agnostic architecture. These considerations are based on best prac-
tices in modern software design as well as empirical evidence from an edge
compute analysis in Section 3.1.
3.3.1 Monitoring Agility and Control
As motivated in Section 3.1, an SDN controller is required for both monitoring
and forwarding traﬃc to distributed NFV Infrastructures. The following high-
lights the options for SDN controllers as well as methods for NFV connectivity.
3.3.1.1 SDN Controllers
In terms of SDN controllers, there are a variety of options, each with vary-
ing support for industry grade requirements. As for scalablility and resiliency,
ONOS, the industry grade controller oﬀers controller distribution. At the time
of design and implementation, ONOS was the only industry grade SDN con-
troller that supported distribution. Since then there is similar capability from
ODL [134]. Alternatively there is Ryu, which does not oﬀer distribution or
failover but instead has simple design that it enables it to focus on stability and
supporting the latest versions of the OpenFlow protocol [166].
3.3.1.2 NFV Connectivity
As discussed in Chapter 2, NFV can have various benefits to monitoring, espe-
cially towards the edge of the network. When applying NFV towards the edge
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of the network, additional considerations need to be made as to where and how
traﬃc is redirected. Various other SDN monitoring frameworks [186, 180, 221]
achieve NFV by the use of middle-boxes or simple port mirroring. Neither of
these solutions are agile and require operator intervention to install and adapt.
Network Service Header (NSH) The Network Service Header [161] con-
tains information which defines the position of a packet in the service path,
using a service path and path index identifiers, and carry metadata between
service functions regarding policy and post-service delivery. The NSH Request
For Comments (RFC) is specifically made to solve the challenge of NFV con-
nectivity, however, as of 2019, NSH is only supported in software by a modified
version of OvS.
Source Routing (SR) with IPv6 The use SR for providing NFV connectiv-
ity is arguably the most elegant solution currently available, however it requires
IPv6; many of the SDN controllers, OpenFlow and P4 implementations have
varying levels of IPv6 support [140, 39].
Vendor locked tunneling This is achieved by using SNMP, REST, or pro-
priety interfaces to create GRE tunnels. This solution quickly and easily recti-
fies the issue but is not future proof and also locks the framework into a single
vendor.
VLAN based tunneling VLANs with SDN can be used to create multiple
overlay networks dynamically. However, this solution is imperfect as it requires
the use of double tagged VLANs if VLANs are already which are not supported
by a the majority of enterprise or customer networks. On top of this, if the
traﬃc has to traverse a non-SDN network, the traﬃc will not be routed correctly,
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whereas with SR or encapsulation, traﬃc will be routed correctly over non-SDN
networks.
Middle-boxes and encapsulation Middle-boxes are placed between net-
working devices to provide additional functionality within the network. For the
use of NFV connectivity, middle-boxes can be used to create tunnels from the
network to an NFV Infrastructure. The added advantage of tunneling traﬃc is
that the data-plane traﬃc is encapsulated, keeping all of its original headers,
and encrypting traﬃc if required.
3.3.2 Monitoring Methodology
Conventional network monitoring uses a variety of methods to monitor traﬃc.
This includes sampled header monitoring, middleboxes, and mirroring. With a
deployed SDN network, monitoring is similar to conventional methods but can
be done dynamically and without additional hardware.
The requirement for monitoring granularity depends on the resources avail-
able and the types of attack that need to be remediated. Some attacks require
deep packet inspection whereas others can be detected via flow header moni-
toring, or even aggregated summaries of traﬃc flows.
The following lists the diﬀerent methods of monitoring, specifically detailing
their trade-oﬀs.
Redirection: This change moves the packet to another destination, which
adds network latency and packet processing latency. This is useful when analysis
is required to be done remotely and that monitoring needs to be done in real
time. A solution like this would only be applied to a small subset of the network
traﬃc.
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Mirroring: The duplication of traﬃc, forwarding the packet normally and
then cloning the packet oﬀ to another location on the network. This style of
monitoring analyses traﬃc after an event has occurred, and thus impacts the
latency of attack detection. If duplicated traﬃc is managed correctly, there is
no latency or bandwidth impact to the source traﬃc.
Middlebox: Oﬀers immensely detailed monitoring by performing full packet
inspection, typically to all network traﬃc that traverses the box. The pri-
mary downside to the solution is the impact of additional latency to all traﬃc,
diﬃculty of processing large volumes of traﬃc, limited network visibility, and
expense to deploy and manage.
Full OpenFlow Packet-In: This solution oﬀers the most detailed monitor-
ing conveniently in one location across the entire SDN network but also oﬀers
the worst performance and is not scalable to network size or traﬃc load [101].
This method also delays the packet significantly, increasing the packet’s latency
by over 20ms and much more when under load [139].
Header monitoring: A lighter weight monitoring solution, that when man-
aged correctly adds little impact to the network, but oﬀers limited monitoring
detail. At the cost of monitoring granularity, sampling of header monitoring
can be utilised for an even lighter weight solution.
3.3.3 Deployment Flexibility
Deployment flexibility is important ensuring that the system can be used in
multiple environments under varied conditions. Architecturally, there are mul-
tiple options to deploying a monitoring system, including: tiered, distributed,
and centralised deployment. In this case, a completely decentralised solution,
such as peer to peer or super peer are not used because of concerns around
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performance, network visibility, incompatibility with existing SDN controller
architectures, and security.
Centralised Deploying with a centralised architecture oﬀers simplicity, re-
duced costs, and with a master slave configuration, resiliency. However, with
there being only one instance in operation at anyone time, both scalability and
availability are compromised. When compared to other SDN network mon-
itoring solutions such as [221, 112, 181, 213, 114], they favour a centralised
approach, in some this is due to a lack of mature distributed controllers avail-
able during their development phase, and in others because of the simplicity
oﬀered by a centralised approach making prototyping much easier than alter-
native methods
Distributed deployments oﬀer increased resiliency, availability, and depend-
ing on the level of shared state, they can also improve the system’s scalability.
Whilst distribution increases system complexity, if the distributed substrate is
abstracted and robust automation is used with deployment, complexity can be
reduced for developers working on top of the system.
Tiered deployments oﬀer a range of benefits at the cost of deployment, sys-
tem, and management complexity. Where scalability, resiliency, and a separa-
tion of concerns is a primary requirement, a tiered approach is best suited. In
the interest of future compatibility, tiered architectures are considered under
NFV standardisation, with ETSI’s NFV architecture [72].
3.3.4 Network Service Orchestration Methodology
At the time of writing, the open source implementations of MANOs, as high-
lighted in section 2.3.2 have limited support for orchestration, and typically rely
on a variant of a first fit policy. The reason behind the use of this single policy
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is around what the Virtualisation Infrastructure Manager (VIM) defaults to,
for example, in typical Cloud OpenStack deployments, first fit deployment is
well suited. On top of this, as explained in Chapter 2, they only support Cloud
based infrastructures where placement resources are relatively simple and well
understood challenges when compared to the Fog. With Network Functions Vir-
tualisation and Fog computing, network service orchestration is more complex
than conventional NFV, which deploys to the Cloud. The number of locations
in the Cloud-to-Fog give room for further optimisation in orchestration. Or-
chestration is required to place network services in the best location within the
network depending on an optimisation factor.
For this thesis, three orchestration methods are considered for diﬀerent con-
texts. The primary orchestration for network monitoring is a distance and con-
text aware based orchestration. In scenarios where the network is shared and a
range of network services need to be considered, an auction based orchestrator
can be used.
Cost-based Orchestration Important to motivating the use of edge net-
works, this method of orchestration considers the economic cost of deploying
network services at diﬀerent locations depending on the cost of network trans-
fer. This motivates the decision to place services that require high data rates
to be placed closer to the network target or client where the service is served.
Service Agnostic Auction-based Orchestration This method of orches-
tration provides a platform for multiple customers to rent out infrastructure for
period of time, thus naturally supporting multi-tenancy. This has the benefit
of oﬄoading the orchestration logic to one or more third parties.
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Monitoring Orchestration Facilitating network monitoring, this method of
orchestration is a distance and context aware technique that considers the dis-
tance between the network target and the service and also considers the available
capacity on each link to place a network service. This method of orchestration
also has the ability to automatically scale services and move services depending
on demand.
3.3.5 Virtualisation Technology
Virtualisation is used to execute multiple services on a singe machine, typi-
cally oﬀering a form of resource management and isolation to the service. The
deployment of network services to the Cloud-to-Fog continuum raises many
challenges, including the use of an appropriate virtualisation technology. As
stated in Chapter 2, the Cloud-to-Fog is a highly heterogeneous environment,
including multiple computing architectures as well as varied amounts of com-
pute, memory, and disk.
Virtual Machines (VMs) Oﬀer full operating systems were code does not
require to be recompiled. From an ease of use point of view, these are VMs
simple to adopt and have been used for over a decade. Previously VMs were
the primary choice for any virtualised software.
Containers are analogous with processes with increased isolation. They share
the host’s kernel but have their own libraries and network interfaces. The pri-
mary benefits of containers include: same compilation process, significantly
reduced size and memory usage, short initialisation (<1s) [79], and isolation.
On the other hand, containers provide a weaker level of isolation than other so-
lutions, and due to the additional network interfaces, can have reduced network
performance. Since the wide adoption of containers, they are a popular choice
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for micro-service architectures and are now supported by a variety of tools for
service orchestration [107, 162, 12, 8, 86].
UniKernels These are small kernels that are compiled in to single purpose
applications. Only the libraries required for the application are on the UniKer-
nel, making the resulting OS compact and eﬃcient. At the time of writing, this
technology is relatively immature and producing eﬃcient VNFs or applications
is poses significant challenges [209], especially when deploying to non-x86 ar-
chitectures, such as ARM due to the lack of support at this time. In summary,
the pros of UniKernels is that they oﬀer strong isolation, reduced overheads,
and small base image size.
3.3.6 Technology Agnostic Architecture
To improve the system’s robustness and longevity, the fundamental design of the
system should be able to resist obsolescence as well take on new best practices.
Robustness and longevity can be ensured by using a componentised and loosely-
coupled design where parts of the system can be easily segmented and replaced
if needed. The trade oﬀ here is potentially a performance hit and also increased
time to develop. However, as this space is moving quickly, future proofing and
being technology agnostic is important to the longevity of the design. The
following details the various areas that are prone to change in the near future.
Southbound Protocol: The southbound protocol in an SDN refers to the
protocol between the SDN controller and SDN compatible switch [121]. Open-
Flow is the current forerunner of the southbound protocol and data plane imple-
mentation for SDN technology. This said, P4, the data plane implementation
has recently gained traction oﬀering various benefits over OpenFlow. The data
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plane design should be designed to be technology agnostic such that it can reap
the benefits of new protocols.
SDN Controller: Over the years there have been many SDN controllers,
each with their own unique aspects. The most stable and mature controllers
at the moment are: ONOS, ODL, and RYU. Whilst there is uncertainty about
which controller will continue to have support, the design of the system should
be agnostic of the controller, such that it can be changed with ease in the future.
Network Hardware: With the emergence in P4, new hardware might be
implemented with new benefits. This is also true for OpenFlow, for example,
in 2018 Corsa released an OpenFlow switch which was combined with large
internal compute resource and additions to the protocol
The system should be broken up into subsystems and sub-subsystems so that
components like message queues, interfaces, and databases can be replaced if
needed.
3.4 Design Overview
With the design considerations noted previously, Figure 3.6 shows a high level
overview of the diﬀerent components of the system. At the overview level of
the design, the system is split up into five isolated pieces: the monitoring and
security framework, the network controller, the orchestrator, the NFVIs, and the
forwarding devices. This general design follows a loosely coupled architecture
so that each component can be updated individually and can be used on their
own. Other implementations of similar systems such as [181, 112, 221] have
merged these components together into one monolithic block.






















Figure 3.6: Grand Architecture Overview
The overall design as illustrated in Figure 3.6 shows Siren influencing the
network controller and managing the Network Functions Virtualisation Infras-
tructure. Moreover, the network infrastructure is managed by the network
controller, which reports monitoring information and exposes control to Ten-
nison. Tennison also receives monitoring alerts from deployed network func-
tions from the NFV Infrastructure. In summary, the interaction between these
three loosely coupled components and two infrastructures provide a scalable
and responsive network monitoring system.
3.5 Tennison: Monitoring and Remediation
Framework
Tennison is a framework that focuses on providing scalable monitoring and
remediation. This section describes the Tennison system architecture high-
lighting the individual components and features of the design.
The overall system architecture for Tennison, in Figure 3.7, is formed of
three distinct architectural layers. The lower layers (Bro and Snort DPIs, ONOS
Controllers, and sFlowRT) are the appliances and instances deployed within the
network, cumulatively referred to as the Collection layer. These instances are
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fundamental to the operation of Tennison, in that they provide both control













































Figure 3.7: Tennison System architecture
In some cases, minor extensions have been made to the Collection interfaces
to enable them to report and communicate with the Tennison Coordinator,
which forms the Coordination layer of the architecture, and is responsible for
storing and aggregating all of the information generated by these interfaces.
The interfaces between these interfaces and the Coordinator represent a flow of
information, with the interfaces providing input or output (see legend in Fig-
ure 3.7). From this illustration, it is evident that both the packet inspection
tools and the flow monitoring applications produce input while the ONOS con-
troller alone oﬀers an output. It is this output that enables the coordinator to
modify the forwarding plane of the network, via the ONOS controller, and pro-
vide the functionality and programmability required for Tennison to operate
eﬀectively.
The Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the overall operation of the
architecture, and acts as an intermediary between the upper and lower layers;
Application and Collection layers, respectively. The Coordinator is intention-
ally built independent of any other component, and is completely technology
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agnostic. This allows interoperability with alternative technologies and flexibil-
ity in terms of design and placement in the network. Furthermore, every aspect
is componentised and networked and only holds state if required. As a result,
the system is easily distributable (i.e. multiple Tennison instances) as only
the database is the primary aspect which holds state, and as such, Tennison
is able to scale to the size of network.
The central role of the coordinator grants an authoritative view of the net-
work topology and its current state with the ability to simultaneously modify
both the network and the monitoring services running within it.
The final, and uppermost layer, is the Application layer, which hosts the
security applications. These applications interact with the coordinator leverag-
ing its functionality to realise custom and dynamic security behaviours. This
enables the creation of applications tailored to specific threats, or integration
with existing tools already deployed in a network.
The remainder of this section contains a detailed breakdown of each of the
components, including contextualising them in the overall system architecture.
3.5.1 Tennison Coordinator
The Tennison Coordinator is central to the Tennison architecture, and is
responsible for the overall operation of the system. In this section, the sub-
systems within the Coordinator that together provide the rich functionality to
security applications in the Application layer (see Figure 3.8) are detailed.
We start by describing a series of Southbound Interface (SBI) modules that
communicate with appliances within the collection layer. These modules pro-
vide a rich set of information to the coordinator, allowing it to make a wide
range of powerful, yet informed, decisions with respect to network monitoring
and attack remediation.
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Figure 3.8: Tennison Coordinator subsystems including
southbound interface
3.5.1.1 Southbound Interface (SBI) Modules
The first is the Flow Control interface, which is an output from the Coordinator.
The Coordinator uses this to control the flow of traﬃc through a network,
directing and shaping this towards the various appliances under its control.
Importantly, the Coordinator does this in an intent driven way; it describes the
changes at a high level without specifying precisely how this should be achieved.
For instance, the Coordinator does not define the exact switch on which a flow
should be modified. It is the responsibility of the network controller to decide
the optimal placement of this given its awareness of the topology. More details
of the interaction with the network controller are provided in Section 4.1.2.
The remaining four SBI modules all provide inputs to the Coordinator. The
Alert Listener is a REST interface used to collect messages generated from the
various packet inspection appliances located in the network. An alert message
is generated by a DPI tool when a suspicious flow or packet flows through the
appliance. This alert is then passed from the appliance to the coordinator via
this interface module. A similar process is followed for the IPFIX Collector,
sFlow Collector and Resource Monitor interfaces. The diﬀerence between them
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being the type and content of the message received on each interface. In the
case of the IPFIX Collector, aggregate flow records are received from the net-
work controller. Similarly, the sFlow Collector provides sampled flow record
statistics when high volume monitoring is used in the network. Finally, the
Resource Monitor collects resource usage information (e.g. cpu/memory/flow
table occupancy) from the switches and controllers in the network.
This resource information is used for dynamic decision-making in the Ten-
nison monitoring and security system. For example, placement of the monitor-
ing to avoid potential switch flow table overflow and avoid controller processing
overload. Together, these four interfaces provide a holistic view of the entire
network, including traﬃc levels, threat analysis and resource utilisation.
3.5.1.2 Data Broker
Regardless of the message type, once a message is received at the Coordina-
tor, its content is passed to the Data Broker. This acts as an intermediary to
determine the destination of the message within the system. There are two pos-
sible destinations; the Policy Engine and/or the Event Logger. Importantly, the
Data Broker enables extensibility of the southbound interface. It does this by
providing a generic interface to which new collectors can connect. Furthermore,
the Data Broker queues messages, acting as a virtual buﬀer between incoming
messages and the policy engine.
3.5.1.3 Event Logger
The Event Logger is a long-term storage medium, realised with a key-value store,
that keeps each message in its entirety. This database can then be searched by
other components to retrieve historical information (through the Northbound
API or Policy Engine, as illustrated in Figure 3.8). It provides persistent storage
for the coordinator, enabling rapid recovery in cases of failure or migration.
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The event logger can also be configured in such a way that stored messages are
automatically expunged after a fixed period. This allows the storage footprint
to remain consistent without the need for explicit maintenance.
3.5.1.4 Policy Engine
The Policy Engine is an integral part of the coordinator and contains the logic
through which new messages are processed (originating from one of the input
interfaces), historical trends are analysed (through the Event Logger) and re-
sulting actions are taken (through the Flow Control). The policy engine has
a permanent storage state to record security policies and monitoring decisions.
It is also fully configurable by security applications, to add, remove or modify
logic, as required. Examples of the behaviour of this policy engine under various
attack scenarios, are described in Section 4.1.3.
3.5.1.5 Northbound Interface
The Northbound Interface is key to enabling the programmability and extensibil-
ity inherent in Tennison. For clarity, the upper components of the coordinator
are illustrated separately in Figure 3.9. The northbound interfaces enable the
security applications to both read the current network state and to modify it
according to custom internal logic. These interfaces are clearly defined such
that applications from diﬀerent sources (and with diﬀerent objectives) can be
used in parallel.
The security applications connecting to the northbound interface first reg-
ister with the controller by providing a unique ID and a set of credentials.
This enables the coordinator to identify the application, and to authorise it
with the appropriate permissions. This includes permission to read the net-
work topology, and permission to interact with neighbouring applications, as
required. Tennison hosts two application types; managed and unmanaged. A


























Figure 3.9: Tennison Coordinator Northbound Interface
managed application can be controlled by another security application, whereas
an unmanaged application cannot. This can be used to create a hierarchy of
applications, to share state and behaviour between applications, and to remove
potential conflicts in terms of network behaviour. To support managed appli-
cations, the Coordinator provides the necessary northbound API calls to query
existing applications, including their availability, uptime and current state. Us-
ing this information, a neighbour application (if authorised to do so) can also
start, stop or configure other managed applications. Any application, regard-
less of its management status, can query the coordinator to search for messages
(e.g. IPFIX, sFlow, DPI alert, etc.) received by the Coordinator (including
current and historical information). Similarly, using this same interface, the
application can query the current logic of the Policy Engine. This enables the
requesting application to understand the current behaviour of the architecture,
aiding in avoiding potential conflicts. Finally, the northbound interface enables
the security applications (regardless of their management status) to add, remove
and/or modify the rules within the Policy Engine. From a system security per-
spective, this capability is closely controlled by the application authorisation,
with relatively fine-grained permission supported in Tennison.
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3.5.2 Tennison Multi-level Monitoring
Tennison operates a tiered system of monitoring to provide scalable network
security. The multiple levels of monitoring are illustrated in Figure 3.10, with
light-weight monitoring for a high volume of flows at Level 1 (L1) and Level 2























Figure 3.10: Tennison multi-level monitoring triangle
“PreFIX” identified in Figure 3.10 is part of the first level of monitoring
(L1) and, by default, provides network layer four header information for the
first packet in the flow for every flow. At both L1 and L2, sFlow provides
latent, always-on sampled monitoring. Furthermore, as sFlow can be configured
on non-SDN switches, it provides Tennison with visibility of legacy networks.
sFlow captures flow information based on sampling. The sFlow agent in the
network element is configured to export sFlow records to sFlow-RT, which then
reports alerts to the Tennison Coordinator for remediation and to support
multi-stage attack detection. The sampling rate, polling rate, and packet header
length are configurable and can be dynamically updated based on the network
state and immediate monitoring requirements.
In addition, at L2, IPFIX data input to Tennison based on defined Open-
Flow monitoring intents provides a more fine-grained and continuous monitor-
ing capability suitable for detection of attacks that can evade a sampling-based
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monitoring approach.
Finally, L3 represents Tennison’s capability to forward suspicious traﬃc
towards DPIs for classification. This leverages Tennison tunneling, which
provides the means to forward and mirror specific traﬃc from any host on the
network to any destination without modifying the packet. This is a further
example of the scalability of the system. As the network increases in size and
DPI processing throughput reduces, additional DPI instances and tunnels can
be instantiated on-the-fly ensuring optimal network protection provision. As
identified in Section 3.3.2, there are various monitoring methodologies available
for use, each with their own trade-oﬀs. These methods include: Redirection,
mirroring, middleboxes, OpenFlow Packet-Ins, and header monitoring.
Adaptive behaviour allows for various methods of monitoring to be applied
depending on traﬃc classification and network context. Traﬃc classification
can be used identify the severity and profile of the attack and adapt network
monitoring behaviour accordingly. Network context can benefit adaptation in
understanding the amount of available resources.
3.5.3 SDN Controller Distribution
Controller distribution adds availability to the network whilst improving re-
siliency by taking away the single point of failure. However, with this there is
additional complexity and diﬃculty of adapting the controller to new paradigms.
On top of this, in cases where state is continuously shared by data rich controller
applications, performance can become degraded due to the increased overhead
from state sharing. For the goal of scalability as a part of this thesis, the im-
plementation of controller distribution and correct configuration and usage is
paramount to reaping its benefits eﬀectively.
In terms of controllers, the Tennison and Siren designs are agnostic of
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the network controller. In the case of SDN controller distribution with Ten-
nison, in the design, all unnecessary SDN applications are stripped from the
chosen SDN controller. On top of this, the SDN controller Tennison appli-
cations themselves require no state transfer, instead relying on the controller’s
distributed function for operations that operate over multiple controller do-
mains.
3.5.4 Tiered Network Monitoring
As a part of Tennison’s flexible deployment options, this section details an
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Figure 3.11: Tired architecture design
As described in Section 3.3 and motivated in Chapter 3.1, multiple ap-
proaches to scalability should be included within the design.
Background research detailed in Chapter 2 found that other SDN monitoring
frameworks including [14, 112, 221, 181] do not address scalability and instead
focus on other challenges within SDN monitoring. Based on performance from
published by ONOS [137], a full state sharing distributed architecture has its
limitations for scalability. To incorporate increased scale as well as a separation
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of concerns, this section describes a tiered approach. As shown in Figure 3.11,
each tier in this architecture has a wider reach but has less information about
the network.
The primary reasons for this architecture over others are:
• The tiered architecture provides a centralised control and a wider view of
the network than other architectures.
• Results on scaling SDN [137], as well as various academic publications [184,
220, 101, 72, 193] and ETSI’s specifications [72], suggest that both a tiered
or east-west architecture is a direction that will be supported by SDN and
NFV frameworks as the technologies mature.
• Distributed ONOS can still be used with a tiered system, providing re-
silience and increased scale at multiple levels.
In this architecture, it is envisaged that the network is split up into multiple
subdomains, each of which is controlled by an ONOS cluster, and in turn a
monitoring framework.
Subdomain Manager The Subdomain Manager is largely the same to the
standard implementation of the monitoring framework, but with another inter-
face which is connected to the domain manager, sharing detailed information
on alerts and events. The bottom level of the monitoring framework in Fig-
ure 3.11 also has a fail over node in the design for redundancy and will also
be able to operate autonomously if required, such that if the link between the
subdomain and the domain manager was to fail, security and monitoring would
continue. This will simply work by fully replicating the underlying database
that holds both the events and the policy engine. The addition, to the subdo-
main controller includes a new northbound application, the Tier Manager. This
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application shares data with the meta monitoring framework, in this case that
is the Intra-domain coordinator.
Domain Manager The Domain Manger is responsible managing fine-grained
alerts and events between the framework’s interfaces. It is also the component
that configures Subdomain Managers, pushing down local domain polices. In
an enterprise scenario, the domain manager would be under the control of the
organisation that was using it, allowing them to disseminate their own network
monitoring policy across multiple subdomains.
Inter Domain Manager The Inter-Domain Manager is responsible for man-
aging coarse-grain information between domains. The Inter Domain Manager
will also be the insertion point for updates on new security vulnerabilities and
detection methods, such that new identified attacks could be mitigated. Where
Tennison is provided as a service, the inter-domain manager would be main-
tained and operated by the providers of the service, allowing for remote security
network patches and visibility of multiple networks at once.
3.6 Siren: Infrastructure Management and Or-
chestration Platform
In this section, the design for Siren, the Infrastructure Management and Or-
chestration Platform is detailed. Siren is an infrastructure provisioning, man-
agement, and orchestration framework. Siren addresses a gap in current
MANOs where heterogeneous environments are not considered.
The remainder of this section goes into detail on the components and or-
chestration methods within the Siren architecture, illustrated in Figure 3.12.













































Figure 3.12: Cloud-to-Fog Infrastructure Management and
Orchestration Platform
3.6.1 Service Discovery
The Service Discovery module is a centralised location where data about Siren
compatible NFVIs are stored. Each NFVI is reported by their respective Agent
on boot of the infrastructure. The agent passes information about the available
resources, IP address, firewall policy, and global connectivity status via an an-
chor. This data is then correlated with topology information from the network
controller to automatically ascertain the NFVI’s network location.
3.6.2 Service Provisioner
The Service Provisioner is aware of the available network resources. Its key
function is to operate within the heterogeneous Fog environment, translating
requests from the orchestrator to deployed VNFs on the NFVIs. Siren supports
deployment to both ARM and x86 architectures in Docker format.
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3.6.3 Agents
Agents are small programs that are run on each node within the NFV Infras-
tructures. In the ESTI MANO architecture, an agent can be part of many
elements, including the element manager and the virtualisation infrastructure
manager. Agents are useful for reporting the status of their host, passing data
about available resources and the state of running services. In Siren’s design,
the agent is responsible for launching services, and reporting status information
to both the life cycle manager and service discovery modules.
3.6.4 Life Cycle Manager (LMC)
The Life Cycle Manager keeps track of all of the running network services and
checks and reports errors as well as terminating a service when its time has
expired. The LMC is critical component in the design of Siren, ensuring that
the infrastructure is reset after a service has expired.
3.6.5 Orchestration Methodologies
Orchestration is used to decide which network services are placed where. Siren
supports multiple methods of orchestration. Depending on the context, a dif-
ferent orchestration method is used. In the context of experiments with Ten-
nison, a simple cost-based metric is used for placement of network services.
Additionally, Siren supports multi-tenancy through an auctioning system for
choosing placement of network services.
3.6.5.1 Auctioning
For the NFV placement problem [19], to support multi-tenancy, a novel combin-
itoral auctioning [54] approach is considered when deploying to heterogeneous
environments such as the Fog. This allows bidders to define bids containing
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combinations of discrete sets of resources. In our example scenario, each of the
providers is able to bid on exactly what they require for their service. Fur-
thermore, as resources in the Fog could be located in diﬀerent administrative
domains, depending on the sensitivity of the service, the auction may be fil-
tered by a resources administrative domain. For example, a bid could contain a
package consisting of 128MB of RAM, 2 CPUs and 10GB of storage across 400
devices located specifically in local home networks. Importantly, the purpose of
these bids is to reserve and allocate those resources for a fixed period of time;
resources are auctioned again for other adjacent time slots. This system enables
multiple providers to use the same set of resources at diﬀerent times during the
same day. The bidding operates in multiple phases, each bidder creates their
packages in each phase. If two bidder’s packages overlap, one bidder has to buy
out the overlapping package. Once bidding is over, the Auctioneer will alert
each Service Provider as to which of these reservations has been successful.
The Service Providers will then supply details of the service they wish to run
on their reserved infrastructure, using a supported templating language (such
as Docker’s Dockerfiles).
The next step begins the realisation of the aforementioned reservation. The
Auctioneer informs the Provisioner of each successful reservation, which is then
actioned on the constituent devices. This includes creating the relevant con-
tainers and services, and ensuring that they are kept within their particular
resource constraints. The service is now deployed, and will remain until the
reservation window expires. When this occurs, the Provisioner will clear the
existing reservations, and make way for new services to be deployed.
3.6.5.2 Cost-based
As suggested by [27], the cost of placement of a network function is orthogonal
to the cost that creates on the network. Therefore, network provider cost must
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be taken into account.
Equation 5.2 in Chapter 5 shows an example of a path cost calculation for
lease of a resource for a single hour. C represents the cost set by the provider
for an amount of network transfer m. A network provider may also wish to cost
their network on a per hop basis, where some hops might be more expensive
than others. Thus the equation supports a standard fee plus a fee for the path
that the service will traverse. These values are entirely configurable within the
system. For the purposes of illustration, a cost has been added to the reservation
of bandwidth, however, these are not necessarily representative of a true cost,
as this would likely be diﬀerent from one network provider to another. Cp and
Cn represents the value in cents per mbps. The equation for the cost-based
placement algorithm is detailed in Section 5.2.
3.6.5.3 Network Awareness-based
With a network controller as an abstraction to the network, contextual network
information is readily available. Information about network traﬃc, deployed
network services, and the topological distance between the two, optimisation
can be applied to best deploy services to the network such that they reduce the
number of hops on average per flow. This deployment can then be updated pe-
riodically to address the change in network traﬃc profiles. The implementation
of this is detailed in Section 4.2.4.
3.7 Data Plane Pipeline Design
The data plane design is important for ensuring eﬃcient and correct processing
of packets. For monitoring, the data plane needs to collect network statistics
and report them back to a central data point. On top of this, a form of mirroring
and network overlay is required for sending traﬃc to NFVIs.
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In this space, there are two main technologies, OpenFlow, which has existed
since 2008, and P4 which was initially conceived in 2014.
3.7.1 OpenFlow
Network monitoring was not initially a primary objective of OpenFlow. How-
ever, since OpenFlow 1.3, various features have been added that can aid network
monitoring and remediation. These include: table statistics, multiple tables,
VLAN modification, and metering.
The design details for an OpenFlow monitoring and Cloud-to-Fog supported
NFV data plane are illustrated in Figure 3.13. The OpenFlow monitoring
pipeline separates monitoring, NFV, and forwarding functions out into four
OpenFlow tables. Initially, packets enter the pipeline where their headers are
monitored, packets from new flows are sent to the controller for initialisation.
Whilst this has an obvious performance impact, several measures are taken to
mitigate this. Firstly, known flows can be proactively initialised for header mon-
itoring on initialisation of the controller, secondly, Packet-Ins from the pipeline
will only occur once in a pipeline, meaning that forwarding applications that
require reactive behaviour can share the same packet-in. Next, the packet tra-
verses to the Dynamic ACL table, this is where packets are dropped, metered
or forwarded. Subsequently, the packet enters the NFV overlay table, at this
point, a new header is appended to the packet for routing on an overlay net-
work, at the same time this packet is mirrored and finally forwarded to the
forwarding table where routing takes place. In addition, asynchronously, the
switch is periodically reporting information about header statistics.
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Figure 3.13: OpenFlow monitoring pipeline design
3.7.2 P4
P4 (Programming Protocol-Independent Packet Processors) is a data plane pro-
tocol that allows one to configure how packets are processed on a packet for-
warding device. Since 2014, P4 has matured, and is approaching a point where
network monitoring is feasible. This section describes what a P4 pipeline for
monitoring will look like. Later on are some results on the calculated perfor-
mance improvements over an OpenFlow implementation for monitoring. As
Tennison uses ONOS, and ONOS is aiming to generically implement P4 [141],
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Figure 3.14: P4 monitoring pipeline design
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The design for a P4 monitoring pipeline is illustrated in Figure 3.14. There
are three key diﬀerences to note between the presented design for the P4 and
OpenFlow pipelines. These diﬀerences consist of: message digests, DoS preven-
tion, and internal NFVI redirection.
3.8 Summary
This Chapter has detailed an architecture to achieve the aforementioned aims
of this thesis, and to address the challenges highlighted in Section 3.1. The
decisions made here are based on the state of the art technologies as well as
fundamental concepts in distributed systems, Software Defined Networks, and
Network Functions virtualisation.
Fundamentally, the design decisions in this chapter have all been focused
on achieving, scalability, responsiveness, extensibility, and eﬃciency, all whilst
providing a pragmatic solution to implementation and deployment. Key to scal-
ability, the recursive design of Tennison allows for tiering to be done without
significant additional implementation.
The design of Siren and Tennison are intentionally agnostic of the south-
bound and northbound technologies to improve the longevity and validity of
the designs. This is particularly prudent with upcoming data plane technologies
such as P4, which show promise for greatly improving upon current southbound
solutions.
This leads us onto the next Chapter where the designs of both Siren and




In the previous chapter, the design of two systems was described which would
enable deployment a scalable monitoring service to the Cloud-to-Fog Contin-
uum. This chapter describes the implementation of both the orchestration
system: Siren, and the SDN monitoring system: Tennison, as well as their
relationship.
4.1 Implementing Tennison
This section details the implementation ofTennison based on the design shown
in Section 3.5.4. In addition to the core features of the system, supporting
programs including the GUI and experimentation frameworks are detailed in
Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.9. On top of this, the operation of Tennison’s example
northbound applications are detailed to show the event flow of the system.
Previously, in section 3.5, the design of Tennison was detailed, Figure 4.1
shows the prototype implementation of this design, consisting of 4 layers.
The bottom most layer in the implementation shows the physical infras-
tructure. This consists of the physical network, the network controller, ONOS
Core, and the deployed virtualised network services, which are delivered by
Siren. The ONOS core connects directly with the next layer, passing control
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Figure 4.1: Tennison Implementation Overview
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and information about the network to the Tennison and Siren ONOS ap-
plications. This layer oﬀers an abstraction to the core Tennison application,
providing light weight monitoring data to Tennison, and making complex net-
work changes as intents. On top of this, alerts from Snort and sFlowRT are
passed up to the 3rd layer which informs Tennison about network anomalies
through deep packet inspection and provide light weight monitoring for legacy
components of hybrid networks.
The third layer shows the core of the Tennison implementation. The sys-
tem is centered around a message queue that collects information from the
network and is then accessed by the policy engine. These messages are then
processed by the policy engine which as shown in Section 5.1.5.3, can process
hundreds of thousands of network events per second before queuing events.
Finally, the uppermost layer shows Tennison’s northbound applications
which interface to the third layer over a REST API. Applications attached to
Tennison have the ability to view all network events, manipulate the policy
engine table, and directly interface with the Tennison ONOS apps. On top
of this, each application that registers with Tennison is given a clone of the
message queue, this ensure that it does not aﬀect the operation of other Tenni-
son applications operation. The application that exercises most of Tennison
North Bound Interface is the GUI, which visualises Tennison’s policy engine,
the network topology, connected DPIs, and network statistics about hosts on
the network. The other applications shown in Figure 4.1 oﬀer attack detection
for DDOS, DOS, and port scans. Each one of these detection applications are
under 200 Lines of Code and are available for review on Tennison’s GitHub
page [199].
The remainder of this section goes into detail on the implementation of
unique aspects of Tennison not implemented in similar systems.
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4.1.1 Tennison Security Pipeline
A key benefit of Tennison is the ability to provide network monitoring and
remediation without interfering with forwarding functionality and additional
services. This transparency is achieved with the Tennison security pipeline,
as shown in Figure 4.2. The pipeline manifests itself as an ONOS driver, which
positions Tennison’s security tables in front of other network application ta-
bles.
A number of designs were considered for the security pipeline during the
development of Tennison, alongside an analysis of the level of conformance
of current market SDN switching equipment with OpenFlow 1.3 functionality
(such as, multi-table support oﬀering the flexibility of match-action entries per
table, and group chaining functionality). In order to provide a practical solution
capable of deployment with available SDN devices, and because of limitations
identified with current SDN hardware switches relating to the number of tables
available, the match fields per table, and the actions available per table, the
Tennison security pipeline assumes only the base non-extended OpenFlow 1.3
requirements.

































Figure 4.2: Tennison Security Pipeline
As shown in Figure 4.2, tables controlled by Tennison precede the regular
forwarding functionality. This enables transparent monitoring and actions to be
implemented without the requirement to modify the forwarding functionality.
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This is important to generalise the process of monitoring networks; it is no
longer tightly coupled to forwarding.
Tennison employs a security pipeline with a total of four flow tables:
• The Tunnel table is the first table in the overall pipeline and acts as
an overlay forwarding application that uses VLANs to separate tunneled
traﬃc. The primary purpose of the table is to forward traﬃc to the nearest
DPI service on the network.
• The Stripping table is used to strip tunneling forwarding logic (pop
VLAN headers) from mirrored flows. Although not strictly required, this
table is maintained to support compatibility across all OpenFlow 1.3 com-
pliant hardware and software switches.
• The Remediation table contains the remediation intents. Following the
required tunneling management, this table appears next in the pipeline
in order to optimise network performance by blocking/dropping traﬃc
identified as malicious before it absorbs further processing resources.
• The IPFIX table contains the monitoring intents. This table is last in
the security pipeline and may pass monitored traﬃc either to the DPI
table for further analysis or directly on to the forwarding pipeline.
4.1.2 Network Controller
Tennison relies upon the presence of a network controller to operate eﬀec-
tively. Using SDN technology, this controller should be capable of viewing and
modifying the underlying physical or virtual network paths, and support traﬃc
steering or manipulation. As long as this functionality is present, Tennison
does not require a specific SDN technology. For the purpose of this work, ONOS
is used as the Network Controller [22].
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4.1.2.1 Controller distribution
Designed by ON.Lab, Open Network Operating System (ONOS) was launched
in 2014 as a SDN network operating system for service provider networks with
a focus on high availability, scalability and performance. ONOS implements
distributed control with multiple controller instances forming a cluster. The
clustering of controllers is a process through which one or more controllers are
connected and data about the state of the network is shared between them.
The intention of clustering is twofold: 1) to ensure that in the event of one
controller failing the other remaining controllers in the cluster will ensure the
network remains functional, and 2) to provide scale-out of the system; making it
possible to manage networks with hundreds of networking devices and thousands
of hosts.
The ONOS cluster instances synchronise to provide a global network view
graph using the RAFT consensus algorithm. The StorageService interface en-
sures a consistent state of the databases across all the instances of an ONOS
cluster. Each network element is assigned a master ONOS instance and the
remaining instances will be secondaries for that network element. If the master
instance fails, an election takes place between the remaining instances to elect
a new master. It is possible to balance between the masters to provide an even
distribution of network elements to each member of the cluster.
For Tennison, distributed ONOS provides a scalable and fault-tolerant
substrate. Tennison also leverages the ONOS default distributed forwarding
and routing applications.
4.1.2.2 Security Intents
As previously described, the Coordinator can change the behaviour of the net-
work by interacting with the network controller. To do this, the coordinator
pushes intents down to the controller, which then actions these to eﬀect changes
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in the network. These intents are topology-agnostic, with the controller han-
dling their optimal placement. Several modifications have been made to ONOS
to support integration with Tennison, creating a more generic intent API.
These modifications are present as an ONOS application and are represented
as the Flow API in Figure 3.7. The ONOS application is registered with the
highest priority in the ONOS event processing pipeline to support the flow
illustrated in Figure 4.2. The provided intents are as follows:
Monitoring intent A monitoring intent instructs the controller to insert a
monitoring rule in the network for a specific flow. Based on this rule, the ONOS
controller will insert flows into switches that the flow traverses. It will then use
this flow to receive detailed OpenFlow statistics about the flow. These statistics
are then aggregated and converted into IPFIX data which is then passed to the
Tennison Coordinator via the IPFIX Collector.
Redirection intent A redirection intent instructs the controller to insert a
rule in the network to redirect a specific flow (defined by a tuple) towards
a specific type of appliance. For example, it may instruct the controller to
redirect all TCP traﬃc destined for port 80 towards the nearest Snort DPI
instance. This redirect modifies the complete flow, and stops any packets of the
flow from traversing the normal forwarding path within the network. Based on
the security pipeline logic, the redirection intent is written to the first table of
the Tennison pipeline. The redirect prevents the flow from continuing along
the forwarding pipeline, and the traﬃc is tunneled to a new destination (e.g.
DPI appliance).
Mirror intent The mirror intent has similar functionality to that of redirec-
tion. However, there is a significant diﬀerence in that the original flow remains
in the network. As such, the traﬃc is forked, with the duplicate flow tunneled
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towards a new destination (e.g. DPI appliance), whilst the original packets are
forwarded as normal.
Remediation intent A remediation intent is the final step of a security ap-
plication used by Tennison, and enables the coordinator to make a definitive
action with regard to an identified and detected threat. This includes com-
pletely blocking a flow in the network, or rate limiting a flow to control its
behaviour. As previously noted, this intent is written to the third table in the
Tennison pipeline.
4.1.2.3 ONOS Application Pipeline
The ONOS application pipeline dictates the order in which applications receive
events from the network. Figure 4.3 shows the Tennison’s implementation of
the ONOS application pipeline, where its applications are prepended. This is
of particular importance to Tennison’s functionality, enabling it to get events
before any other applications, ensuring that it is receiving all available data
and that it can drop monitoring events as to not unnecessarily overload the
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Figure 4.3: ONOS Tennison Application Pipeline
4.1.2.4 Implementing Multi-level Monitoring
There are two key factors in the implementation of multi-level monitoring in
Tennison. The first is the Tennison policy engine, which enables the network
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operator to define and specify monitoring and security detection and protection
mechanisms in accordance with the network deployment environment. Figure
4.4 provides a visualisation of the policy engine in the form of a match action
table. This table is hit when a new event enters the coordinator; an event
could be generated from a variety of sources including DPI, sFlow-RT, IPFIX,
PreFIX, or a custom event from a northbound application. The three columns
in Figure 4.4 represent the following: Matches, which consist of packet headers
or alert types; Conditions, which verify if an event violates a threshold; and
Treatments, which manipulate or upgrade the level of monitoring for specified
traﬃc. For example, policy #2 can be read as follows: given a DPI alert on a
specified MAC src address, that flow will be blocked. Similarly, for policy #4,
given an sFlow_RT alert for an identified IP src address, and with the threshold
specified by policy #1 exceeded, that flow will be rate limited.
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Figure 4.4: Tennison Policy Engine Illustration
The second key element in Tennison multi-level monitoring is the resource
monitor, which provides three specific functions based on analysis of the re-
source usage information; (1) The optimal placement of the monitoring rule
(i.e. on which switch(es) along the traﬃc path to place the rule) is determined
with the objective of maximising network protection while maintaining network
performance (i.e. avoiding potential switch flow table overflow and controller
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processing overload). (2) In the case that a switch/controller pair is approaching
a resource limit, the management of the switch will be transferred to another
controller. This enables more eﬃcient network operation and accelerates detec-
tion/protection times in the case of attacks due to reduced latency on the data-
control communication path. (3) In a high-traﬃc volume scenario, the resource
usage information is used to dynamically adjust the monitoring level (simulta-
neously reducing the IPFIX monitoring and increasing the sFlow sample-based
monitoring to actively manage the network resources). While introducing a
marginal increase in attack detection time, this multi-level monitoring design
enables continued network operation under high load.
4.1.3 Tennison Security Functions in Operation
Tennison is designed to support the detection and remediation of a variety
of attack types. In order to demonstrate Tennison’s multi-level monitoring
capability, this section describes four attack scenarios (summarised in Table
4.1) that are used to exercise diﬀerent components of the system. Tennison’s
detection capability goes beyond these four attack scenarios, but they serve to
illustrate the operation ofTennison in the context of a series of specific attacks.
Some steps have been simplified for ease of understanding. The accuracy and
timeliness of Tennison in detecting and remediating these attacks is detailed
in Section 5.
4.1.4 Single Host Volumetric Denial of Service Attack
Attack: A single host is flooded with a high volume of traﬃc. The attacking
traﬃc may appear to originate from anywhere on the network.
The system components required in the DoS Detection/Protection method
are illustrated in Figure 4.5. (1) The operator defines the response to sFlow
event alerts. In this example, the source is blocked. (2) The defined policy is
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installed in the policy engine. (3) sFlow datagrams received by sFlow probes
are sent to sFlowRT. (4) A DoS event is detected based on the pre-configured
sFlow application and the alert triggered in Tennison. (5) The security policy
is generated (i.e. block rule) by Tennison and the event is logged. (6) the
security policy is received by the ONOS flow rule subsystem (Flow API), and
(7) OpenFlow flow rules are sent by ONOS to the network elements (not shown
in Figure 4.5). (8) Finally, an alert is posted to the GUI to inform the operator
that a DoS has been detected and blocked.
4.1.5 Distributed Volumetric Denial of Service Attack
Attack: A single host is targeted by a volume of traﬃc originating from a sig-
nificant number of sources. The attacking traﬃc may appear to originate from
anywhere on the network.
The system components required in the DDoS detection/protection method




















Figure 4.5: Tennison sFlow DoS Detection/Protection
are illustrated in Figure 4.6. (1) ONOS exports IPFIX messages to Tennison.
(2) The DDoS security application identifies suspicious traﬃc and marks it for
further monitoring. (3) A threshold is installed in the policy engine to use
lightweight monitoring for any subsequent traﬃc matching that flow. (4) The
coordinator instructs ONOS to install rules to use lightweight traﬃc monitoring
(using Tennison’s ONOS intents). (5, 6) IPFIX monitoring on the ongoing
traﬃc triggers the suspected DDoS threshold. (7) The threshold action is mod-
ified to redirect the suspicious flows to Snort. (8) The coordinator instructs
ONOS to install rules to redirect traﬃc. (9) Snort identifies a DDoS attack and
sends an alert to the coordinator. (10) The alert matches the alert threshold
in Tennison policy engine and triggers the block flow action. (11) The coor-
dinator uses the ONOS Tennison intents to block the attacking flow(s). (12)
An alert via the GUI informs the operator of the attack remediation. (13) This
process is repeated until all of the flows taking part in the DDoS are blocked.
4.1.6 Scanning Attack
Attack Definition: A single host (Attacker, Host A) scans another host on the
network. The Attacker scans the top one hundred TCP ports as defined in the

































Figure 4.6: Tennison IPFIX DDoS Detection/Protection
nmap-services file. The ports are scanned in random order. The attack may
occur over an extended period of time (minutes to hours).
The system components required in the Scanning detection/protection method
are illustrated in Figure 4.7.
(1) ONOS exports IPFIX messages to Tennison detailing ongoing traﬃc.
This data is read by the port scan security function. (2, 3) The security function
identifies a port scan and posts an alert to the policy engine to block any
subsequent traﬃc matching the malicious flow. (4, 5) The incoming message
to the coordinator triggers the threshold in the Tennison policy engine then
applies the block flow action. (6, 7) The coordinator uses the ONOS Tennison
intents to block the attacking flows. (8) An alert is posted to the GUI informing
the operator of the port scan detection performed to remediate against the
malicious flow.
4.1.7 Intrusion Attack
Attack Definition: Detection of a scan for a vulnerable version of VSFTPD
(Very Secure FTP daemon). VSFTPD version 2.3.4 was compromised with a
backdoor in June 2011 [212]. In Table 4.1, the detection method is identified























Figure 4.7: Tennison Scanning Detection/Protection
as DPI. This can be further detailed as the detection of Ascii characters 58 41
10 (a smiley face) in the ftp username field with implicit recognition of the ftp
control port, 21.

























Figure 4.8: Tennison Intrusion Detection/Protection
The system components required in the Intrusion detection/protection method
are illustrated in Figure 4.8. (1-2) A new security policy is added to the Tenni-
son policy engine such that a flow rule is generated and pushed to the network
elements to detect ftp traﬃc, (3-5) ftp traﬃc is then redirected to the DPI for
inspection. (7) In the example provided, if the username contains a smiley face,
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an alert is generated by the DPI and an event raised at the Tennison coordi-
nator. (8-10) A block rule is then created and pushed to the relevant network
elements to isolate the malicious host. (11) The operator is alerted via the GUI
that an attack has been blocked.
4.1.8 Tennison Web Console
The web console provides the operator with network management and debug-
ging information and also provides control of network monitoring for manual
operation. The GUI is connected to Tennison’s northbound API, as described
in Section 3.5.1.5. The GUI is served by a dockerised NGINX instance which is
proxied to a python flask server, making use of a web backend with web sock-
ets, accounting and shared state. Ultimately, the GUI can handle reporting live
information to multiple users at once, with a minimal overhead per active user.
Figure 4.9: Tennison GUI Dashboard
Figure 4.9, is a screen shot of the GUI dashboard. Information presented on
the dashboard is a summary of what is already present on the other web-tabs.
The dashboard shows information about the systems status and configuration,
detailing the number of ONOS, Tennison, and Snort instances connected, as
well as load information about the load of the policy engine, number of alerts,
and overall number of flows observed. The dashboard is particularly useful for
observing and validating the system’s behaviour.
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Figure 4.10: Tennison GUI Monitoring
Figure 4.10 shows an extract of the Tennison’s monitoring page. Provid-
ing an overview of traﬃc on the network, the monitoring page shows header
information of the monitored flows in the network.
The flow data shown on the page is live and is made using WebSockets [215].
WebSockets are used between a client side JavaScript application and a server
side python process with the flask library [82], resulting in live data sent between
the coordinator to the GUI. The benefit of this is that the GUI provides a
more tactile feel with the data, assisting with debugging and demonstrating the
system’s capability.
Figure 4.11: Tennison Policy Engine
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Figure 4.11 shows the state of the policy engine within the Tennison co-
ordinator. For manual operation, policy entries can be modified, deleted or
created here; this is especially useful for testing or for temporarily patching
security holes on the network until the underlying cause is remedied.
Figure 4.12: Tennison GUI Topology
Figure 4.12 shows the network topology, including Tennison nodes. The
example shows Tennison running in tiered mode with two sub domain man-
agers and two instances of ONOS. When interacting with the topology shown in
Section 4.2.5, similar to the Siren topology, a web modal pops up with device
information detailing the resources available and connection information.
As well as the pages above, the GUI has various other pages which for
brevity are not illustrated here. These include a log-in page, tiered GUI page,
tiered topology page, and an application page. The applications page allows
for Tennison northbound applications to inject their own management page
which is automatically generated from their configuration file. An example of
an application management page is available in Section 4.17.
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4.1.9 Experimentation Framework
In order to conduct rigourous and repeatable experiments with tiered Tenni-
son, distributed ONOS, and Siren, a considerable amount of automation was
required as manual initialisation was not feasible, taking several hours for an ex-
periment run. When testing at the largest scale as shown in Section 5.1.7, the
environment required six instances of Tennison, twelve instances of ONOS,
twenty-four instances of Snort, one-thousand instances of OpenvSwitch, and
one-thousand emulated hosts. Whilst Mininet is designed to spawn the switches
and hosts at this scale, significant work was done in automatically spawning and
connecting ONOS, Tennison, and Snort to the network.
Manifest.json
tennison_domains: 1-X, <sw1, sw2, sw3…>
scaling_method: <Single, >
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Figure 4.13: Tennison Experimenter Design
Figure 4.13 shows a representation of the experimentation framework, show-
ing a manifest file that describes the experiment parameters which is then fed
into the experimenter application. The experimenter then launches all the com-
ponents along with a profile that specified timings of replayed network events,
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this is ran for a predetermined time (default 10 minutes) the results are gathered
and then the experiment is terminated or rebuilt for another iteration.
4.1.10 Tiered Implementation
As detailed in Section 3.5.4, tiered Tennison is required to maximise the scala-
bility of SDN network monitoring and remediation. Tiered Tennison is based
on a recursive design, reusing most of the core system at each tier of opera-
tion. Tennison’s recursive implementation means that a single code base can
be used and maintained for diﬀerent systems, instead of having three separate
code bases for each tier. The following section details the specific additions to
the core of Tennison required to support tiering. These include additional




















Figure 4.14: Tiered Tennison
Figure 4.14 shows an overview of Tennison’s tiered implementation, show-
ing a domain manager that has control over multiple subdomains, which in turn
connects to distributed ONOS clusters. In order to experiment with a prototype
of tiered Tennison, only the subdomain and domain tiers from Section 3.5.4
has been implemented. In the tieredTennison prototype implementation, each
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subdomain operates independently with full control over the network it is man-
aging. Changes sent down from the domain manager are subject to acceptance
via the configuration in the tiered manager at each subdomain.
The remainder of this section describes the required additions to Tennison,






















Figure 4.15: Sub Domain Manager
The element in Figure 4.15 highlighted in green shows the additions for the
sub domain managers. The Tier Manager Application sits above Tennison’s
northbound API and relays the state of the policy engine and the event logs to
Tennison’s domain manager. As shown in 4.17, the Tier Manager comes with
a web interface application page providing functionality to configure the type
and detail of data passed up to the domain manager.
The Domain Manager is at the highest level of control in Tennison’s tiered
architecture, having the widest visibility of network monitoring. Figure 4.16
shows the additions for the domain manager, including a generic southbound in-
put and a tiered GUI application. The four center southbound interfaces on the
Domain Manager are not used as messages from the Sub Domain Managers are
already processed and serialised, instead all messages are sent through a generic
input southbound interface. The Flow Control interface operates similarly to
























Figure 4.16: Domain Manager
the Sub Domain Manager but instead of pointing to the network controller the
intent is passed down to the sub domain manager which then forwards it on to
its own network controller.
Figure 4.17: Tiered Manager GUI
Configuration Component
Figure 4.17 shows the tiered manager application GUI for Tennison’s sub
domain. The Tennison GUI has been updated to allow the modification of
northbound applications at runtime. For the tiered manager, this allows the
user to dynamically set the level of data that is sent from one tier to another.
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This includes the polling rate, and a series of checkboxes to select the security
primitives to be shared, such as packet headers and snort alerts.
Figure 4.18: Tiered Domain Manager GUI
Managing multiple instances of Tennison requires a central access point.
Figure 4.18 shows the tiered GUI manager for the tiered Tennison domain
manager. On the GUI, each site is shown along with a summary of the site’s
status, on top of this is an access URL that redirects the operator to that sub
domain’s instance of Tennison. The left side of the figure shows the geograph-
ical network topology, detailing the location, size, and number of uncleared
alerts at each site through a traﬃc light system. The Topology diagram was
created in JavaScript with D31 and automatically updates in size and colour
from web-sockets that are periodically sent data from the Tennison’s Tiered
Domain Manager.
This section has detailed the prototype implementation of tiered Tennison,
showing the additions to the standard architecture and graphical interface. Re-
sults on the impact of this design are available in Section 5.1.7.
1https://www.d3.org
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4.1.11 Summary of Tennison Functionality
To conclude this section, the attributes in Section 3.1 are revisited, detailing
each challenge is overcome from a functional standpoint.
Chapter 2 highlighted security frameworks and applications that build on
the SDN characteristics of programmability and logically centralised control. A
number of these works identify the deficiencies of relying on centralised control
when deploying network security solutions. Specifically, this relates to the per-
formance limitation introduced by the control communication channel. The re-
sponse to a network attack should be as eﬃcient as possible, and not constrained
by communication channel resource, or indeed, controller processing capacity.
A further limitation of recently proposed security frameworks/applications is
the reliance on modifications to OpenFlow, SDN devices, or interference with
fundamental network forwarding behaviours. These modifications often restrict
the proposed solutions to deployment in a specific network type, with specific
network equipment, and for a single or limited set of security functions.
The Tennison framework is motivated by the desire to present an adaptive
and extensible security platform that is technology-independent and capable
of supporting a wide range of security functions. Tennison does not remove
the requirement for controller interaction, as demonstrated in Avant-Guard and
OFX [180, 186]. However, the level of controller interaction is rendered flexible
and proportionate to the threat detection requirements. This is further helped
by the use of other monitoring and inspection tools that are deployed to the
network, relieving pressure from the SDN control channel. For example, with
one level of monitoring, sFlow provides a separate monitoring path is used
while maintaining the programmability of remediation mechanisms via the SDN
controller. This level of defence can be configured by the network operator or
automatically adjusted in response to resource monitoring in order to optimise
network protection. Through eﬃcient monitoring, tiering, and distribution,
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Tennison has multiple solutions for scaling network monitoring.
• Eﬃciency and Proportionality: Tennison provides an eﬃcient mon-
itoring and remediation framework where resource consumption is com-
mensurate to current threat levels. This includes tailoring the type and
scale of monitoring according to the anticipated attack types within a net-
work along with actual resource usage such that the monitoring and se-
curity functions are appropriately distributed. Tennison supports stan-
dard network monitoring protocols such as sFlow and IPFIX, incorporat-
ing them in a multi-level monitoring function. This means that separate
monitoring paths are available and the optimal monitoring method can
be selected per security function. The remediation mechanisms are sim-
ilarly eﬃcient; enabling an operator to prevent, scale or limit an attack,
depending on certainty or severity.
As demonstrated, a volumetric attack can be eﬃciently detected using
Tennison Level 1 monitoring with sFlow while more fine-grained attacks
engage Level 2 IPFIX monitoring and/or Level 3 DPI capabilities.
• Scalability and Visibility: The network view provided by the dis-
tributed ONOS control function and leveraged by the Tennison coor-
dinator enables placement of the monitoring and remediation rules on the
appropriate network devices for optimal security protection.
Tennison has an overview of the entire network with scalability enabled
by the lightweight and latent monitoring solution. Visibility across the
network includes legacy equipment, through compatibility with ubiqui-
tous protocols such as sFlow. Furthermore, Tennison is designed with
a coordinator separate to the distributed SDN controller such that con-
trol and management can be separated, as required, supporting parallel
processing across multiple devices. This both helps with scaling out the
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system, and maintaining openness in the selection of Tennison’s con-
troller. On top of this, Tennison’s support for a tiered architecture
maximises both scalabiltiy and network visibility, providing monitoring
and control over networks with thousands of devices.
• Programmability and Extensibility: The pre-defined security func-
tions described in this section are activated or deactivated via the GUI. To
modify a threshold in an existing function, for example, DDoS attack trig-
ger threshold, the new threshold value is simply added via the GUI. This
will automatically be mapped to the relevant Tennison components. To
introduce a new security function, the template sFlow/IPFIX/DPI appli-
cation can be modified and activated via the GUI.
The Tennison framework provides a rich API that allows operators to
define the behaviour of the network and its resources in response to new
and existing threats. This includes oﬀering multiple monitoring and re-
mediation mechanisms, and a GUI, each of which can be flexibly used by
the operator. Rather than simply providing a finite set of security func-
tions, it is possible to build new security functions within the Tennison
framework.
• Transparency: As per the Tennison security pipeline, benign traﬃc
is processed through the network as normal while suspicious traﬃc is
monitored and dropped or forwarded, as determined by the activated
security functions. On top of this, the ONOS pipeline was modified to
ensure that Tennison’s apps processed packets first.
• Availability and Resiliency: Due to the distributed control platform,
the monitoring and security capabilities ofTennison are maintained even
in the case of a failure of a controller instance.
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One of the key requirements of a SDN security platform is the resilience
of the control plane to support high availability and provide redundancy
in the case of controller failure [171]. For this reason, Tennison has
been designed to integrate with a production-grade distributed controller,
ONOS [22], which supports high availability and fault tolerance.
Tennison is transparent to other network functions within the network.
This is realised using a custom security pipeline, which means that it
can run seamlessly alongside other network functions without modifica-
tions. This is built using the OpenFlow multi-table feature to provide the
network monitoring and remediation without interfering with the basic
forwarding functionality and additional services of the network.
• Interoperability: The integration of Snort DPI withTennison is demon-
strated with the intrusion attack example. Available DPI instances are
automatically detected by Tennison. The operator can configure an
alert to be displayed on the Tennison GUI to highlight a particular
attack detection.
• Accessibility: Tennison security policies can be added or modified both
via an API and through a purpose-built graphical user interface (GUI).
The GUI presents the extensive functionality of the API in a user-friendly
and accessible style. Consequently, it is easy for researchers and operators
alike to extend the Tennison system for further research or to adapt to
a new scenario.
Finally, Tennison works in conjunction with de-facto industry-standard
security tools. The DPI connectivity has been tested and operated with Snort,
however, the implementation is agnostic in that it supports a range of other
DPIs including Zeek [202] and Peafowl [153].
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4.2 Implementing Siren
This section details the implementation of the Infrastructure Management Frame-
work, Siren based on the design shown in Section 3.6. Initially, this section
illustrates Siren’s implementation through a class diagram, which shows all
primary components and how they are connected.
NFV Services ONOS application
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Figure 4.19: Siren Implementation Overview
Figure 4.19 shows the relationship and code layout of the Siren prototype
implementation. Within the diagram, Siren is constructed of four layers, fol-
lowing the design shown in Section 3.6. The bottom most layer shows the
network and virtualisation infrastructures, one abstracted by ONOS, and the
other by docker. These components are then connected to the core of Siren, to
get container state, launch new containers, and retrieve the network topology.
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In Siren the Docker Engine is used as an agent for each NFVI. The remote
Docker API [62] is used to poll information about the host including the run-
ning services, health of each service, and amount of resources remaining. To
retrieve information about the network, ONOS’s northbound REST API [142]
is used, in eﬀect, making Siren a northbound application to ONOS.
The upper most layer shows the northbound applications, including the
GUI and orchestration additions. These application interface with Siren’s
REST NBI [183] to indirectly monitor and manipulate the network and vir-
tualisation infrastructures. The monitoring orchestrator application takes the
network topology, virtualisation topology, and deploys monitoring services to
the network. The Auctioning application [4] advertises virtualisation resources
to third parties, and then proceeds to auction them oﬀ. Siren’s life cycle
manager automatically removes services after the lease period has expired.
4.2.1 Test Virtual Network Functions
A set of example, over-the-top or application layer network functions were cre-
ated for demonstration purposes. These represent the functions that each ser-
vice provider wants to deploy. In reality, one service provider may oﬀer a
multitude of diﬀerent services.
4.2.1.1 DPI
Snort [163] is used to perform DPI on packets so that they can then be forwarded
to a central control which then informs the network operator. Alternatively
this alerting process could be automated, eﬀectively making an IPS. These two
alternatives have a trade-oﬀ between network overhead and remediation time.
For the purposes of the results below, the DPI was in a store, check, and forward
mode. Siren also supports using this in a mirroring configuration, whereby the
user does not see any increased latency.
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4.2.1.2 DNS
PiHole [61] is a popular locally executable DNS service that black-holes un-
wanted DNS requests. This oﬀers the ability to block certain domain names
whilst providing lower latency than public DNS servers. This would be a service
that could be used by either business or home users. In this example, clients
are configured to use PiHole for all of their DNS requests.
4.2.1.3 CDN
A CDN based service is generally useful to home and business customers. For
the CDN, a NGINX server hosts a ’big bunny’ video file. Through the operator
interface detailed below, the service IP address is presented which can be used
for a new clients to connect to it. This is configured through the client’s video
player, usually via a manifest file.
4.2.2 Network Controller
Originally built with Ryu, Siren moved to using ONOS for compatibility with
Tennison. For NFV orchestration, the network controller provides NFV con-
nectivity and updates on the network topology.
Siren’s network controller connectivity is essential for eﬀective orchestra-
tion of network services. In particular for vDPIs, the controller passes informa-
tion about network traﬃc and topology so that Siren can be deployed to areas
that require increased levels of monitoring.
4.2.3 Dynamic Redirection and Mirroring to Distributed
VNFs
The dynamic redirection and mirroring network function takes in the network
topology and Siren’s infrastructure state to map locations on the network to
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create an overlay network for traﬃc that needs to be redirected to a VNF. In
the network monitoring use case, the NFV overlay is used for mirroring traﬃc
to a DPI. In the content caching use case, this entails redirecting traﬃc to the
nearest cache.
Currently, open source industry-grade SDN controllers do not have a generic,
vendor agnostic tunneling solution. Where tunneling is required in an SDN
environment, it is typically manually configured on the SDN switch using an
existing tunneling protocol, such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE).
This approach is unsuitable for scenarios where there is a need for the dynamic
scaling up/down of functionality, for example, allowing network functions to be
added or removed within the network automatically. For this reason, Tennison
introduces a new OpenFlow-based tunneling solution.










Figure 4.20: Overlay Network Tunnels
This solution is oﬀered as an ONOS application that can be called by other
applications to create point-to-point tunnels; importantly using only OpenFlow
to achieve this. In the case of Tennison, tunnels are created between the
switches and DPI nodes on the network. Suspicious traﬃc is then tagged with
a VLAN ID for mirroring and forwarded via the tunnels to the nearest DPI on
the network. When new DPIs are added to the network, tunnel paths are au-
tomatically recomputed, ensuring that flow tagged by the system as suspicious
are routed to the nearest DPI.
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The integration of tunneling in the Tennison security pipeline is illustrated
in Figure 4.2 and described in Section 4.1.1.
4.2.4 Monitoring Orchestrator
The monitoring orchestrator is a northbound application to Siren, and is the
key component in use for Tennison. This is important as it automatically
and intelligently places DPI services into the network and connects them to the
network using ONOS.
Algorithm 1 shows how the core operation of the monitoring orchestrator
works. Firstly, resources from both ONOS and Siren are queried, returning
information on the underlying infrastructure and network. The algorithm runs
at controller startup and then via events which show that the policy is not
satisfied. This information is then used to satisfy the policy as detailed in
Section 4.2.4.1.
The policySatisfied method takes in the operator written network policy.
This method checks to see if the policy is satisfied, getting resources deployed to
the infrastructure, and confirming that they are in accordance with the network
policy. One example of this is to see if one of the resources has reached its policy
limit, in which case the policy is not satisfied and the loop continues.
The core element of the algorithm is the findOptimumResource method that
takes in virtualisation and network resources as well as a map links them to-
gether. With this information the method initially returns the policy’s mini-
mum amount of vDPI as randomised locations over the network such that there
is mixed distribution of them. After the initial deployment, this method will
get available resources when services become exceeded. Policy permitting, the
method will then proceed to return optimum locations based on one closest to
the overloaded service. After this cycle has executed, vDPIs that are not used
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(assuming at least a minimum deployment) will be freed so that resources are
available for overloaded locations.
Algorithm 1: Monitoring Orchestration Algorithm












Function findOptimumResource(netRes, virtRes, map, policy):




if r! == null then
return closestResource(r, netRes, virtRes, map);
end
return;
4.2.4.1 Orchestration Policy Manifest
Figure 4.21 details the manifest file for Siren’s monitoring orchestrator. This
is used to configure the orchestration policy, allowing the operator define pa-
rameters that influence how vDPI services are deployed to the network. These
parameters include the minimum resources (CPU, Memory, Disk, Network) re-
quired to deploy a service; this helps the orchestrator find appropriate NFVIs.
On top of this, a number of requests per second is defined which is how the
orchestrator identifies whether a vDPI VNF is overloaded. Finally the scaling
policy is defined, which sets the minimum and maximum number of replicas
that the orchestrator is permitted to deploy.
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Figure 4.21: Monitoring Orchestrator Yaml policy file
The policy shown in Figure 4.21 is similar to policies used within Cloud
based orchestration solutions. For future work, this policy could be extended
to include cool down periods for scaling, adaptive thresholds, and configurable
polling times.
4.2.5 Siren: Web Console
This section details the web console which assists the operator in managing
Siren and its infrastructure. The web console is illustrated in Figure 4.22.
Figure 4.22: Siren GUI
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The web console shows the operator available resources in the NFV Infras-
tructure and what services are currently running. The primary purpose of this
is to demonstrate as well as verify Siren’s operation. From left to right, the
GUI shows pools of resources within the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. At the bot-
tom of the web page, information about live auctions is also presented, so one
can see which providers are competing for each resource. When an NFVI is
clicked on the interface, a list of URIs is provided which the operator can use
to verify the services that is running on each device.
4.2.6 Siren in Operation
This section describes a high level step walk through of the operation of Siren
via the use of an example of one of its orchestration methods.
The following time series goes through the steps illustrated on Figure 4.23,






















































Figure 4.23: Siren Operation
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1) Firstly the server boots and registers itself with the discovery service,
reporting IP address, firewall, CPU, Memory, Storage, and Network interfaces.
2) This information is then crossed with topology data to tag the server with
a location. On top of this, the provisioner is notified of a new resource. 3)
The monitoring orchestrator request for an initial deployment, spreading DPI
services across the network according to the orchestration policy. 4) The pro-
visioner interfaces with the infrastructure over remote docker API to start the
new service. On top of this, the new service is added to the LMC. Additionally,
the controller is contacted to create a new network overlay. 5) The docker en-
gine pulls in and executes the new network service. 6) The network controller
creates a new network overlay in preparation for the new network service. 7)
After a policy predefined time, the orchestrator evaluates the network traﬃc
and current deployment and then continues to deploy more services in optimal
locations, repeating steps 4-7. 8) After the policy defined lifetime, the Life
Cycle Manager removes the service from the NFVIs.
4.2.7 Siren Summary
This section has presented a prototype implementation named Siren and its
operational behaviour for managing and orchestrating network services in a
Fog environment. Key to this thesis, Siren enables Tennison to be eﬀectively
deployed over heterogeneous environments.
The Siren prototype implementation has focused on the support required to
operateTennison eﬀectively in the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. This has included
supporting heterogeneous environments, scaling out virtual network functions
to network traﬃc and context, and creating solutions to unsolved challenges in
NFV, including VNF placement and NFV service chain forwarding.
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This Chapter has presented two proof-of-concept implementations that to-
gether are capable of scalable network monitoring and remediation in the Cloud-
to-Fog continuum. In the next Chapter, these systems are evaluated, validating




In this chapter, the designs for the Siren and Tennison prototypes imple-
mentations are evaluated. Firstly, in Section 5.1, a comprehensive evaluation
of Tennison is shown, evaluating its scalability, responsiveness, performance
increase over upcoming technologies, and finally a direct comparison versus sim-
ilar frameworks. Next, in Section 5.2, an evaluation of Siren is detailed via an
economically motivated example, demonstrating the benefit of operating across
the Cloud-to-Fog continuum.
5.1 Tennison Evaluation
In this Section, a comparison of Tennison against similar frameworks is pro-
vided. This is followed by an analysis of Tennison’s application performance
evaluated in the context of the attack types described in Section 4.1.3.
5.1.1 Framework Comparison
A further comparison ofTennison against similar work is available from [hohlfeldguest].
In Table 5.1, the features of prior scalable, distributed monitoring and se-
curity systems are detailed and compared the Tennison framework.
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Table 5.1: Scalability comparison of SDN security systems










ONOS Yes Hybrid 4+ (Yes) Yes (Control& System) Yes
FRESCO [181] NOX No Reactive 3+ (Yes) No No
CIPA [41] POX No Reactive 3+ (Yes) No No
SDN4S [104] HPE VAN No Reactive 1+ (Yes) No Yes
PSI [221] ODL No Proactive 1+ (via NFV) Yes (System) No
Athena [112] ONOS No Reactive 2+ (Yes) Yes (Control& System) No
CHAOS [179] Floodlight Yes Reactive 1 No No
OFX [186] Ryu No Hybrid 2+ (Yes) Yes (Switch) No
Kandoo [92] Kandoo No Hybrid No (No) Yes No
ElastiCon [60] Floodlight No Reactive No (No) Yes No
Hydra [40] Floodlight No Reactive 1 Yes No
In summary, the key diﬀerences between Tennison and the other simi-
lar frameworks listed in Table 5.1 are the dependence on the the OpenFlow
Packet-In response technique, extensibility, and scaling methods. As detailed
in the design consideration’s for this thesis in Section 3.3, the methods used in
Tennison are to optimise scalability, responsiveness, and extensibility.
Tennison has various aspects that show its ease of use. Table 5.2 shows
the comparison of lines of code (LoC) for each attack detection application
between Tennison and Athena [112]. As shown in Appendix A.1 Tennison
has a published API, an element not found in the other listed frameworks. It is
not possible to provide the comparison with other similar security frameworks
[221, 181, 40, 41] as either their source code is not openly available or they do
not support user applications.
Table 5.2: User Application LoC Comparison
System DDoS DoS Intrusion Scan
Tennison 107 304 0 135
Athena 1946 [14] - - -
As shown in similar work [77, 181, 112], LoC can be loosely attributed
to the development learning curve of a system. The comparison in Table 5.2
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shows that application creation and integration with Tennison is relatively
easy. This is due to Tennison’s rich RESTful northbound API, which enables
users to easily and succinctly create applications without directly adding to the
complexity of the larger system.
5.1.2 Evaluation Environment
To evaluate Tennison, a topology incorporating 350 nodes connected to 19
partially connected switches, representative of a large sized business network
[2] with access, distribution and core networking layers. This topology was re-
alised using the network namespace deployment tool: Mininet [124]. Mininet is
an emulation tool that enables evaluation, validation and measurement of SDN
applications. In order to create the network topology, Mininet instantiates
Linux Namespaces [130] to act as hosts and software switches, (such as Open
vSwitch (OvS). One of the significant benefits of Mininet, beyond using a simu-
lator to create such a topology, is that each of these namepsaces have their own
virtual network interfaces with a fully fledged and isolated networking stack.
This allows testing of systems at significant scale whilst consuming minimal re-
sources. The testbed runs on a general-purpose server with 256GB RAM, and
two Intel Xeon E5-2697v4s totalling 32 cores. The server runs Ubuntu 16.04.3
and resources were shared between Mininet (Hosts, OvS), the SDN Controllers
(ONOS v.1.11) and Tennison. In order to test performance at scale, the con-
troller benchmarking tool cbench [178] is used, which is capable of emulating
the control plane of thousands of SDN switches at once.
5.1.3 Distributed SDN Controller Performance
Prior to testing the performance of Tennison, an evaluation of ONOS was
carried out using cbench to understand the scalability properties and potential
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overheads associated with running a distributed SDN controller. Two specific
experiments were conducted.
Firstly, the maximum throughput of the controller with respect to packet-
in processing was measured. This was achieved by sending packet-ins origi-
nating from 16 emulated switches, and then counting the number of response
packet-outs from the controller. Following ONOS’s testing practice [137], this
experiment was repeated one hundred times to ensure the average results was
valid. The results in Figure 5.1 show the number of responses per second for an
increasing number of controller instances. From this, it can be determined that
the performance of ONOS increases negatively in a logarithmic way according to
the cluster size. Furthering this, cluster sizes larger than 5 are unstable, failing
to distributed messages in a timely manner ultimately causing syncronisation
issues between nodes.






















Figure 5.1: ONOS Controller Performance (Responses/s) -
multiple controller instances
Secondly, the impact that an increasing number of switches has on a variety
of ONOS cluster sizes was measured. For this one thousand packet-ins per
second are generated per switch, and the delay in responses is measured and
averaged.
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The results in Figure 5.2 illustrate the latency with both an increasing num-
ber of switches and an increasing number of controller instances. These results
highlight the trade-oﬀ between cluster size and the number of switches con-
trolled by the cluster. For a network of up to 32 switches, a single controller
instance provides the optimal response time. The reduction in latency is only
achieved with additional controller instances for larger network sizes. Another
factor that aﬀects the optimum cluster size is the level of fault tolerance de-
sired. Notice that 64 switches on a 5 node cluster has a greater latency than on
a 4 nodes cluster, this is due to the addition communication overhead between
nodes. ONOS’s unique design includes multiple instances of RAFT within a
single controller instance, this means that, by default, partition tolerance is

















16 32 64 128Switches:
Controller cluster size
Figure 5.2: Controller Performance (Latency) - varying
controller-switch ratios
The results presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide a benchmark for the
performance of the distributed controller and the relationship between network
size and distributed control. Adding to this, in Section 5.1.5 the impact of
multiple controller instances on detection and remediation time in an enterprise
environment is explored.
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5.1.4 Attack Detection/Protection Latency
The performance of Tennison against the aforementioned attack scenarios is
measured by the length of time it takes to detect and subsequently protect
against each attack. The measurement is subdivided to capture the time re-
quired for each step in the detection and protection process. This is repeated
ten times and averaged for a final result. By accurately timing each stage,
it is possible to analyse each stage of the detection/protection process and to
identify any potential bottlenecks in the system. The attacks (DoS, DDoS,
scanning and intrusion) stress diﬀerent parts of the system. The start point for
each measurement was taken from the beginning of the attack.
Figure 5.3 shows the breakdown of the attack remediation. The following
sections describe the evaluation of each attack scenario and discuss the break-
down of attack detection/protection time. In the Figures, ‘Monitor rule’ refers
to the time to install the appropriate monitoring, ‘App detection’ refers to the
Tennison northbound application attack detection time, ‘Mirror rule’ refers
to the time to install the mirroring rule, ‘Alert’ refers to the time for Snort/s-
FlowRT to detect the attack and generate an alert, and ‘Block rule’ refers to
the time to install the block rule in the relevant network elements. Note that
the time to detect an attack can include the attack execution time for example
x packets within y seconds includes ≤ y in the measurement. This means that
time for an attack to execute is included in the final measurement, this will be
discussed per scenario, as appropriate.
5.1.4.1 DDoS
For this attack, a single host is flooded with TCP SYN requests from multiple
source IP addresses. The attack is executed using Hping3 with the following
configuration: small packet size, SYN flag, random source, and fast sending rate.
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Figure 5.3: Attack Remediation Latency - Single Controller
The method of detection for a DDoS attack is reactive as the number of host
connections has to be tracked and the traﬃc then has to be forwarded to a DPI
for confirmation. The attack is first detected when the number of unique flows
targeting a single host exceeds a configurable threshold within Tennison’s
IPFIX DDoS application. For this experiment, the threshold was set to 70
connections from multiple sources to a single destination within 10 seconds. It
is important to note that using the environment describe in section 5.1.2, it takes
the attacker at least 2.5 s to send suﬃcient packets to exceed the set threshold
defined in both Snort and Tennison. The traﬃc is mirrored to Snort where
the attack is confirmed via the Snort rule (see Figure 5.4). Once an alert is sent
to the coordinator, ONOS is instructed to block traﬃc for that destination in
the network.
a l e r t tcp any any −> any 80
( f l a g s : S ; msg : "TCP␣DDoS" ;
f low : s t a t e l e s s ; th r e sho ld : type both ,
t rack by_dst , count 70 , seconds 10 ;
s i d : 1 0001 ; rev : 1 ; )
Figure 5.4: Snort DDoS classification rule
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Accuracy over detection time
Figure 5.5: Accuracy of DDoS detection and remediation
As shown in Figure 5.3, the DDoS attack detection time is the longest of
all those measured. This is a consequence of the application logic and the time
to complete the attack. However, this combined detection approach ensures a
high detection accuracy (low false positive rate), as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
The accuracy of the IPFIX DDoS application was measured with respect
to the configured Snort detection threshold. The threshold configured within
Snort is designed to detect DDoS SYN Flood attacks. It takes a number of
parameters including packet count, which aﬀect the time to detect an attack
and the False Positive Rate (FPR). The accuracy measurement is based on
Equation 5.1 which describes the relationship between True Positives (TP),
False Positives (FP), True Negatives (NP), and False Negatives (FN).
Accuracy =
TP + FP
TP + FP + TN + FN
(5.1)
The results in Figure 5.5 show that for a detection time between 0 and 1.7 s,
the accuracy is low due to a high False Positive Rate (FPR). However, increas-
ing the Snort detection time, increases accuracy. Of course, this also increases
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the overall attack remediation time. Once the detection time is increased be-
yond 10 s, the accuracy drops sharply. This is due to a high True Negative Rate
(TNR), which occurs because the threshold is now too high to detect the DDoS
SYN Flood attack. Due to this trade-oﬀ, we conclude that a Snort threshold
detection time of 2 s will provide an optimum remediation time and high accu-
racy. Analysis of the error bars in Figure 5.3 highlights a significant variance in
latency for the DDoS attack when compared to the other attacks. This fluctua-
tion in results between experiment iterations is due to the host-intensive nature
of the attack, which causes the attacker to fluctuate the number of packets per
second being sent, thus changing the time until thresholds are met within the
system.
5.1.4.2 Scanning
For this attack, a single host scans 200 ports on another host on the network.
Nmap is used to perform this network scan. The method of detection for a
port scan is reactive as the number of ports has to be tracked. The Tennison
northbound port scan application tracks the number of ports accessed across
all hosts on the network. Once the number of ports between two hosts exceeds
the configured threshold within the defined period, the source of the attack
is blocked. Similar to the Tennison IPFIX DDoS application, the majority
of detection time is attributed to the gradually increasing threshold within the
application logic to determine whether or not the traﬃc is malicious. The results
for the port scan are also in Figure 5.3.
5.1.4.3 Intrusion
For this exploit, a backdoor version (June 2011, 2.3.4) of VSFTPD was used.
The detection method for this exploit is proactive as the required thresholds
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a l e r t tcp any any −> any 21
(msg : "VSFTPD␣Backdoor " ; f low : e s t ab l i s h ed ,
to_server ; content : "USER␣ " ; depth : 5 ;
content : " | 3 a␣ 29 | " ; s i d : 2013188 ; rev : 1 ; )
Figure 5.6: Snort VSFTPD backdoor classification rule
to detect the attack are pre-installed within Tennison; a threshold to mirror
FTP traﬃc and a threshold to define the response to the Snort alert. The FTP
server is exploited by connecting over a network and using ‘:)’ as the username
upon login. This opens a network interface on port 6500 that provides direct
shell access to the server’s host. For detection of the exploit, a threshold must
be inserted within Tennison, notifying it that there is an exploitable server on
the network. Then as the attacker logs in, traﬃc is redirected to Snort which
reads the payload, scanning for ‘:)’ as the username. If detected, an alert is
sent to Tennison, which in turn blocks the attacker.
Figure 5.3 shows that this attack is the quickest to detect. This fast detection
time is due to the proactive nature of the detection method with pre-installed
thresholds. Furthermore, only one packet is required to detect this attack,
the login packet, whereas the other attacks are detected over time following
observation of multiple packets. The results from this attack are indicative of
the general performance of the Tennison framework as the attack exercises
the complete security pipeline (i.e. monitoring, redirecting, and blocking) but
without the variance included by the DDoS/Port Scan applications, which are
dependent on the specific threshold configuration.
5.1.4.4 High-volume DoS
For this attack, a single host is flooded with TCP-SYN requests. The attack
is executed using Hping3. An sFlowRT DoS application is configured with
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sFlowRT’s default threshold to detect network traﬃc towards any host exceed-
ing 20,000 packets/s. The sFlow sample rate is set to 1:500. Once the threshold
is exceeded, an alert is sent to the coordinator. The coordinator then sends a
block intent to ONOS for the flow that exceeded the threshold.
In this case, detection time is primarily dependent on the sFlow sampling
rate configured in the network elements and the processing speed of sFlowRT.
5.1.5 System Scalability
This section describes the eﬀorts Tennison makes towards ensuring scalability
of monitoring. In order to show that Tennison will operate in a variety of
network sizes and topologies, this section also analyses multiple components of
the system and compares the results with statistics from real network traces.
5.1.5.1 Multi-Level Monitoring
The limitations of reactive based SDN applications under extreme traﬃc vol-
umes, i.e. heavy communication and processing workload on the controller,
are highlighted in [24, 56]. To combat this, Tennison implements multi-level
monitoring.
A specific optimisation is also applied to protect the network controller
against the eﬀects of traﬃc flooding scenarios, such as those caused by DDoS
attacks. The solution makes use of the Tennison resource monitor and intro-
duces a thresholding mechanism to scale back the volume of monitoring traﬃc,
when appropriate, to prevent the controller and control plane from becoming
overwhelmed by traﬃc.
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5.1.5.2 Distributed Control Cost
As previously highlighted, in order to scale to larger networks, an increased
number of SDN controllers will be necessary to manage the additional network-
ing devices and requests from the network. As network state information is
shared between all of the ONOS controller instances, this may ultimately lead
to an increase in the Tennison detection and remediation times. To determine
the potential impact of multiple controller instances, additional experiments
were carried out to measure the time to remediate a DDoS attack (as per the
test set-up described in Section 5.1.4.1) in distributed cluster configurations of
varying sizes.


















Figure 5.7: DDoS Attack Remediation Latency - Distributed
Control Cost
Figure 5.7 shows the impact (additional delay) of adding ONOS controller
instances to the cluster. The results show that after the second instance is
added, the time to detect and remediate gradually increases with each new in-
stance. Note that this increase in the remediation time is not attributed to
the design of Tennison but is a result of the distributed ONOS implementa-
tion, which requires state transfer on network events. Research in this area is
currently exploring the optimum design for distributed controllers [152].
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5.1.5.3 Monitoring Performance Analysis
In this section, the scalability of Tennison is analysed from the perspective
of the cost of per flow monitoring. Policy engine performance, flow monitoring
setup time, and RAM usage per monitored flow are explored.
As described in Section 3.5.2, the policy engine in Tennison stores the
thresholds against which the security applications detect an event/attack. The
size of this threshold table and the matching algorithm for event detection is
a potential source of delay in the system. The policy engine matching delay is
therefore analysed. Figure 5.8 shows the time that it takes to process an incom-
ing flow against the threshold table within the policy engine for an increasing
volume of policies (thresholds). The results indicate that the incurred delay is
minor e.g. 500ms to test a threshold when the policy engine contains 100K
thresholds, with the delay increasing approximately linearly.

















Figure 5.8: Policy Engine performance
Figure 5.9 identifies the time it takes to install a set of monitoring rules.
This measurement indirectly shows the maximum capacity of newly emerged
flows that can be monitored per second. Importantly, this does not describe
the ability of the system to manage throughput, but merely shows that this is
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Figure 5.9: Monitor setup time
the maximum number of new flows that could be monitored per second. The
results show that Tennison can handle up to 10000 newly introduced flows
in bursts and 8000 continuously. For flows that have already been observed
and monitoring has already been setup, Tennison will process packets at line
rate as per the capabilities of the networking hardware on which Tennison is
deployed.
Figure 5.10 shows the RAM usage per flow based on actual system readings
during the DDoS attack. The memory usage per flow was calculated from the
overall system’s baseline memory usage and the memory usage measured under
diﬀerent traﬃc loads. The results show that, on average, each flow monitored
consumes around 64KB of RAM. This means that with 6GB of RAM, the
system can keep track of 100,000 flows.
Based on the results in Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10, Tennison can scale to
a range of network environments. For example, one of Facebook’s datacenters
manages 500 unique flows per second [165], and in [20], the authors discuss
10 diﬀerent datacenters that individually support anywhere between 20 to 5000
active flows. In these examples, even in the worst case of all active flows starting
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Figure 5.10: RAM usage
at the same time, Tennison would easily monitor each flow, using less then
300MB of RAM to do so.
The results presented in this section highlight Tennison’s ability to pro-
vide timely detection and remediation against four diﬀerent attack scenarios.
In addition, an assessment of realistic security system performance within a dis-
tributed SDN cluster has been presented. The use of a distributed SDN cluster
is critical to achieve scalability. However, as highlighted in our evaluation, the
benefit of increased controller processing speed must be balanced with the speed
of attack detection and protection. To the best of our knowledge, this work rep-
resents the first analysis of an SDN-based security framework within such an
environment.
5.1.6 Impact of Monitoring with Tennison
The impact of Tennison on the network depends on a variety of conditions.
When traﬃc is redirected to the NFV overlay, bandwidth on that path is con-
sumed. The latency of traﬃc on the network is not impacted due to the adoption
of mirroring and header monitoring over other methods. However, if the unique
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flow count is high enough, it can start to overload the SDN controller, as previ-
ously discussed in Section 3.7, this can be resolved with the upcoming P4 data
plane technology.
5.1.7 Tiered Tennison Evaluation
This section evaluates Tennison operating in tiered mode. It covers three
aspects of scale with the system, analysing the improved raw responses per
second, the response latency over a number of switches and finally the additional
delay added to remediating across domains. The results in this section were
conducted on an 18 core server (32 virtual cores) and 200GB of RAM using the
Tennison experimenter environment to automate the process. This proved
useful in running multiple instances of ONOS on the same machine as multiple
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Figure 5.11: Tiered Tennison latency
This provides a baseline for the performance of ONOS operating in a tiered
fashion. Similar to the results shown in Figure 5.2, Figure 5.11 shows the
round-trip latency between each switch and the controller. These results are
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significantly better than with distributed ONOS. However, notice that the fore-
cast (with r2 value of 95) tapers of after 6 million flows, this can be attributed
to the limitations of scale running on a single server. The first set of results
under 1 and 2 subdomains do not support the larger network sizes. For future
work and to further this scale, the same test could be deployed over multiple
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Figure 5.12: Tiered Tennison responses
Figure 5.12 shows further improvement on the previous results shown in
Figure 5.2. It is now clear that with Tennison’s method of monitoring, it is
possible to scale up to 1000s of networking devices, which was an initial objective
of scalability for Tennison and the thesis goals as detailed in Section 1.4.
As with the other results in scalability, Figure 5.11 shows that there are
diminishing returns for scalability when increasing the number of subdomains.
This is clear in the diﬀerence subdomain count between 4 and 5 where latency is
only slightly improved upon. This can be attibuted to the limits of the available
hardware on and not a limitation of the scalability of the architecture.
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To test the ultimate purpose of tiered Tennison (sharing of network mon-
itoring information across domains), one of the attack scenarios was conducted
across two domains. This included one domain which did not have the port scan
application enabled, and another that did. A port scan was performed across
the two domains, a trigger was caused on the domain operating the port scan
detection application that sent an alert across to the inter-domain manager.
Compared to the results of testing the port scan in a single domain, there was
an additional 1.2 second delay. However, this is attributed to the additional
holding delay, which is configured in the tiered manager GUI. Furthermore,
these results are consistent with the matching delay within the policy engine,
adding these together plus network delay brings us to a similar result. This can
therefore confirm that at the prototypes current state, this is the delay that can
be expected for cross domain remediation.
Figure 5.13: ONOS GUI with Tiered Operation
Figure 5.13 shows the ONOS GUI in operation with Tiered Tennison,
two instances of ONOS each controling 16 switches of a simple 32 switch flat
network. As the network state is not shared at the controller level, the other
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side of the network appears as a single switch and 16 hosts connected to the
rest of the network.
5.1.7.1 Tiered Tennison Summary
Driven by the previous results on distributed and centralised Tennison deploy-
ments, the design was adapted to support a tiered architecture. The results
in this document describe a clear benefit in separating network management
out into multiple SDN islands, showing that SDN and network monitoring can
scale-out to thousands of networking devices.
5.1.8 Comparative Design Evaluation
This section compares the diﬀerence between Single, Distributed and Tiered
operation with Tennison shows the diﬀerence in number of servers verses per-
formance. These results are generated using the same technique that ONOS

























Figure 5.14: Tiered vs Distributed vs Single Tennison
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Technology UFPS Setup overhead Setup latency
P4 Line-rate [51] Digest size <1ms [51]
OpenFlow 8000 [Appendix A] Packet size >10ms [139]
Table 5.3: Performance Diﬀerence Between OpenFlow and P4
Figure 5.14 shows the diﬀerence in scalability between single, distributed,
and tiered deployments. From this, it can be seen that from left to right, each
method has greater scalability, however, it is important to note that this comes
at a cost of increased deployment and management complexity. In a smaller
environment it may still make sense to either a single or distributed deployment
depending on the needs to the operator.
5.1.9 P4-Enabled Tennison
This section details the performance benefits of a P4 design within Tennison.
As mentioned in Section 3.7 on P4 design with Tennison, P4 oﬀers the poten-
tial for significant improvements in performance. Based on P4 and specifically
Barefoot’s Tofino switch, Tennison’s data plane would have significant perfor-
mance gains from a P4 versus its current OpenFlow pipeline. Adding to this, at
the time of writing, the P4-Enabled Barefoot Tofino switch is one of the world’s
fastest packet switching hardware, giving a single device the capability to push
packets at 6.5tbps all through a P4 pipeline [51].
Summarising the diﬀerence in performance between P4 and OpenFlow for
Tennison’s security pipeline, the values shown in Table 5.3 show significant
improvements in unique flows handled per second, traﬃc overhead, and flow
initialisation latency. This is primarily due to P4 being able to create digests
of observed flows and send them to the controller at a periodic interval, instead
of sending a message for each unrecognised flow.
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5.2 Siren Evaluation
In this section, the Siren prototype implementation, and in turn its design is
evaluated. Firstly, this section goes through an example of Siren operating
on network provider cost, considering where services should be placed based
on economic cost of data transfer. It then analyses how network placement
aﬀects the latency various types of virtualised network services, highlighting
the importance of placement consideration.
5.2.1 Network Provider Cost
As suggested by [27], the cost of placement of a network function is orthogonal
to the cost that creates on the network. Therefore, network provider cost must
be taken into account.
Equation 5.2 shows an example of a path cost calculation for rent for a
single hour. C represents the cost set by the provider for an amount of network
transfer m. A network provider may also wish to cost their network on a per
hop basis, where some hops might be more expensive than others. Thus the
equation supports a standard fee plus a fee for the path that the service will
traverse. These values are entirely configurable within the system. For the
purposes of illustration, a cost has been added to the reservation of bandwidth,
however these are not necessarily representative of a true cost, as this would
likely be diﬀerent from one network provider to another. Cp and Cn represents
cost per mbps. For the purposes of illustration for Figure 5.17, the Cp and Cn
have been assigned a value of 10 cents per mbps.















Figure 5.15: Experimentation Environment
5.2.2 Experimentation Environment and Scenarios
To demonstrate the purpose of selective placement and to show Siren in op-
eration, a simplified topology which is representative of a typical ISP topology
with access, distribution and core networking layers is used. The network topol-
ogy, shown in Figure 5.15 consists of 7 switches in the distribution and access
layer and another 4 (not shown) in the core which are connected in a straight
line, this is were the core NFVIs are located. Each link in this topology is
given a 5ms delay to simulate an increased latency the further away on the
network the end point is. This topology was realised using the virtual container
orchestrator Mininet [196]. Mininet is an emulation tool that enables evalua-
tion, validation and measurement of SDN applications. In order to create the
network topology, Mininet instantiates LXCs (Linux containers) to act as hosts
and software switches (such as Open vSwitch (OvS)). One of the significant
benefits of Mininet (beyond using a simulator to create such a topology) is that
each of these containers has a fully fledged and isolated networking stack. This
is particularly useful when simulating separate Fog devices where it is desirable
to run various network functions, which themselves are real applications.
The testbed runs on a general-purpose server with 256GB RAM, and two
Intel Xeon E5-2697v4s totalling 32 cores. The server runs Ubuntu 16.04.3 and


















Figure 5.16: Latency Results From Mininet Experiment
resources were shared between Mininet (Hosts, OvS) DPI nodes, the SDN Con-
troller (ONOS v.1.10) and Siren.
In order to emulate traﬃc on the network, similar to that seen in an ISP
network, a simple web poller was used from 24 hosts. These hosts (connected to
the access layer) were continuously pulling a 243MB "big bunny" video file from
the core network at rates between 10-50mbps. In stressing the network, queues
can be seen in action, which can aﬀect the latency of a connection, especially
when large amounts of data are being transferred as part of that connection.
The impact of this increases as traﬃc reaches the core were traﬃc is aggregated.
5.2.3 Analysis
For the following results two aspects were taken into consideration: Latency,
which is used to determine the benefit a service will provide at each loca-
tion; Cost to the network, which is used to determine if, at least from network
provider fees, a service is economically viable to run at a certain location. The
results on latency were executed 10 times each and then averaged.
Demonstrating the diﬀerences in requirements between services, the results
in Figure 5.16 show the latency of each service at increasing distances from the
client endpoint. This shows that the most bandwidth intensive service, the DPI,
increased the latency greater than less demanding services. In terms of service















Figure 5.17: Example Network Provider Fees Per Month
placement, the results from Figure 5.16 are a motivating factor that the DPI
service provider would use to ensure that their service was deployed as close to
the customer as possible, in order to reduce costs.
The results in Figure 5.17 shows an example calculated cost of running each
network service at diﬀerent locations within the network. This demonstrates
that services that are demanding in terms of bandwidth, are clearly more ex-
pensive to deploy network function further away from the customer. Whereas
with a service such as DNS, where bandwidth requirements are small, assuming
the latency was at an acceptable rate, depending on the wider network policy,
it may be economical for a DNS provider to deploy to the distribution or core
layers. The primary takeaway of these results from Figures 5.17 and 5.16 is
that there are diﬀerent classes of network services which impact providers and
clients diﬀerently depending on their location within the Internet.
In summary of the Siren evaluation, and based on the results in section 3.1,
Siren can orchestrate VNFs across distributed resources, and link them to the
data plane, all whilst achieving an improved eﬃciency both from an economic
and quality of service aspects. These elements are key to enabling Tennison
in orchestrating network monitoring across the Cloud-to-Fog Continuum.
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5.3 Summary
In this chapter, various aspects of Siren and Tennison were evaluated. Each
one of these evaluations was designed to demonstrate the overall systems scala-
bility, responsiveness, and eﬀectiveness at network monitoring and remediation.
Section 5.1.1 has highlighted the diﬀerences between Tennison and sim-
ilar frameworks. The importance of a well designed northbound interface is
evaluated here, showing that Tennison requires significantly less LoC for user
applications. On top of this, a functional comparison is made between Ten-
nison’s capabilities, showing that is has a comparable feature set to similar
frameworks.
Furthermore, Section 5.1.7 has shown how diﬀerent architectures can be
used to increase system scalability, demonstrating a significant increase in scale
when running Tennison in a tiered architecture. In terms of the future of SDN
technology in the monitoring space, this chapter has evaluated potential per-
formance increases with the upcoming P4 data plane technology, again showing
that Tennison’s scalability and responsiveness can be increased further.
In summary, these evaluations demonstrate the feasibility of eﬀectively mon-
itoring networks using software defined networking at varying levels of scale,
satisfying this aims of this thesis. The evaluation here is important for un-




Conclusion and Future Work
Today’s network infrastructure is impacted by insuﬃcient monitoring capability,
as well as limited ability to react against attacks. Adding to this is the lack of
data visibility across the network and continuity in data between monitoring
systems. With the integration of 5G, smart cities, connected cars, and IoT, the
increase in attack surface and nodes on the network requires a new approach to
network monitoring
This thesis has tackled these challenges and has presented a solution which
consists of a multi-level distributed monitoring and remediation framework for
Software Defined Networks, which is enabled by the Cloud-to-Fog continuum.
Together, the two systems in this thesis gather data from multiple sources to
build a holistic view of the network, providing dynamic network monitoring
and remediation at multiple points within the network. With a unique security
pipeline, Tennison oﬀers lightweight visibility across a large number of flows.
Supported by Siren, monitoring is automatically distributed throughout the
network, utilising a bespoke tunneling solution to eﬃciently mirror suspicious
traﬃc. The evaluation of Tennison validates its detection capability and il-
lustrates its performance for low latency protection, as well as scaling to large
networks.
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In summary, Tennison with Siren advances the state-of-the art in SDN-
based network monitoring, attack detection and protection. Tennison has
been shown to perform eﬀectively against a range of network attacks and pro-
vides a flexible framework that can be built upon to develop novel attack de-
tection mechanisms in response to new threats. As technologies mature, future
work will focus on further advancing Tennison’s scalability, as well as ability
to detect attacks with the use of AI.
6.1 Thesis Contributions
This thesis targets a specific set of challenges within the network monitoring
space, motivating technologies and emerging architectures as a solution to a
next-generation monitoring framework. The these objectives are highlighted
by challenges in current networks, as well as potential benefits of upcoming
technologies.
The result of this has been a design and implementation for both an orches-
tration platform as well as a monitoring framework. Together, these create a
solution for scalable and responsive network monitoring in the Cloud-to-Fog.
The following lists the primary contributions present in this thesis:
• Documented experiences and evaluations for diﬀerent architectural ap-
proaches for SDN Monitoring.
• Addressing NFV provisioning, management, and orchestration in the Fog-
to-Cloud continuum.
• Though a novel approach, detailing how SDN can be capable of perform-
ing network monitoring at scale.
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• Using existing specifications such as OpenFlow in a new to create a
pipeline that is capable of scalable network monitoring on oﬀ the shelf
hardware.
• Design for a P4 security pipeline, which provides a new field of work in
SDN network monitoring.
• An open proof-of-concept for Cloud-to-Fog NFV management and orches-
tration with multiple orchestration options.
• An open and feature rich scalable SDN network monitoring and remedi-
ation proof-of-concept.
The contributions listed above are a vital step towards managing, moni-
toring, and securing the next generation of the Internet. The research in this
thesis has provided a solution to challenges around monitoring in future net-
works, where scaling especially towards the edge of the network is of paramount
importance.
6.1.1 Thesis Impact
This thesis has presented two proof-of-concept systems that together create
a scalable and responsive network monitoring solution, that can be deployed
over the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. Both of these frameworks are open source
and are available on GitHub [199, 200] and at the time of writing have received
considerable traction with over a thousand unique downloads. Within these two
frameworks there are various smaller innovations such as the OpenFlow and P4
pipelines, benefiting industry and research in network monitoring. On top of
this, this thesis has highlighted the gaps and NFV forwarding technologies. The
contributions from this thesis could be used by a wide range of beneficiaries,
including ISPs, enterprise organisations, and content providers.
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The Siren proof-of-concept has demonstrated the ability to orchestrate
VNFs across the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. Lessons from Siren contribute to
current MANO solutions to realise NFV deployment outside of the Cloud. On
top of this, Siren oﬀers a new business model in leasing resources similar to cur-
rent Cloud providers, but instead outside of the cloud. As demonstrated in [74],
resources can be auctioned oﬀ to the highest bidder, overcoming the challenge of
deciding the best location to place network services, whilst generating revenue
for infrastructure providers.
The Tennison framework would also be compatible with a new form of
business model, and could be deployed as a package by an ISP to various clients.
The information from tiered Tennison could then come back to a SoC where
the network can be analysed and managed centrally. This could also be used to
monitor the ISP’s own network. Alternatively, a company may decide to deploy
their own private Tennison configuration bespoke to their setup.
The thesis also contributes a testing platform, which can be used by re-
searchers to automate the testing of network monitoring and Cloud-to-Fog or-
chestration systems. Rather than having to develop and build the underlying
policy or provisioning engine, this work provides a common solution in which
a researcher can build and modify the behaviour of the network monitoring
system through the NBI without the burden of extensive development. This
significantly reduces the barrier to entry for research and development in net-
work security and Cloud-to-Fog orchestration.
6.2 Future Work
Recently, there has been clear interest from industry in an SDN monitoring
solution that can be deployed throughout the network; since the start of Ten-
nison and Siren multiple commercial monitoring systems with a focus on edge
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deployment have emerged [52, 17, 31, 106]. As these tools mature, a software
defined network monitoring solution will become easier to deploy and use in
everyday networks.
The following highlights the primary avenues of research for future work
that are related to the main design and development contributions in this thesis:
Tennison and Siren.
6.2.1 Monitoring with Data Plane Programabiltiy
Programmable data planes are reaching an increased level of maturity, with a
number of hardware-based solutions emerging on the market. Driven by the
move to programmable hardware, these enable developers to make decisions on
how to handle packets in a very flexible and powerful manner on the switch
itself. Complementing the programmable control plane oﬀered by technologies
such as OpenFlow, it is envisaged that these advances will help to address some
of the inevitable performance and latency drawbacks of locating a software-
based control plane somewhere other than the switch itself. Fundamentally,
investigating whether, by pushing some of this logic into the data plane, it is
possible to make decisions on how and where to forward packets at very high
data rates. This would be without the need to involve a global controller.
This may mitigate some of the outstanding scale and performance concerns of
existing SDN technologies by reducing the amount of controller-bound traﬃc.
Programming the behaviour of a data plane does carry implicit drawbacks in
that decisions are made with far less visibility of the overall network state and
conditions.
As shown in Sections 3.7, and 5.1.8, P4 is an ideal candidate to operate as a
replacement for OpenFlow, oﬀering lower overheads and greater capability. As
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well as this, P4 hardware implementations are showing support for x86 com-
pute in the packet processing pipeline, opening up the possibility of performing
sampled deep packet inspection as well as encryption on the switch within the
data plane.
6.2.2 Advancing with the Evolution of Edge Computing
As the vision for edge computing evolves and 5G is deployed, similar to CORSA
and Barefoot, more network vendors may consider collocating x86 compute
resource in network switches. This will further motivate deploying network
functions throughout the network.
This thesis has described multiple approaches to VNF placement. New
switches coming to market such as [52, 17] have general compute on the same
device with a loop-back channel that links them to the data plane. This tech-
nology would allow for greater scale, reduced network monitoring traﬃc, mon-
itoring encryption, and lower latency.
Since the initial design of Siren, various edge computing solutions have
emerged [106, 52]. These are tools that in the future will undoubtedly assist
in deploying network services and network monitoring solutions throughout the
network.
6.2.3 Applying Artificial Intelligence
Since the initial design of Tennison, the world of micro-services and software
development has started to move towards a more data centric model. Since
the launch of Tennison new technologies have matured to assist with data
enrichment, visualisation, and data analysis. With this, core components of
Tennison could be replaced by industrial grade tools such as Prometheus for
collection, Kafka for the data bus, and TensorFlow for AI.
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The Tennison coordinator already has a rich API, which allows statistics
and state to be ascertained by other sources. Furthermore, the behaviour and
logic in Tennison can be defined through this interface in real-time. In cou-
pling this together, there is the opportunity for implementing new and novel
functionality to further enhance the eﬀectiveness of Tennison in operation.
One method of achieving this would be the application of machine learning
techniques. This includes the analysis of traﬃc within the network to identify
malicious behaviour, the identification of new features and emerging attack pat-
terns, and the prediction of threats that impact the longevity of the network.
Given the aforementioned API, it would be possible to integrate this function-
ality without the need to directly modify the internals of Tennison; in other
words, the changes could be decoupled, enabling a logical separation of concerns.
Furthermore, due to the architectural design of Tennison, existing algorithms
and implementations of machine learning techniques can be used without the
need to fundamentally re-implement them for this specific context. This allows
for a concentration on evaluation and the opportunity to understand how and
which these approaches can be applied correctly and eﬀectively in the context
of network monitoring and remediation.
6.2.4 Extending Network Monitoring Visibility
The integration of host-based sensing and monitoring within the Tennison
platform would greatly increase visibility of the underlying infrastructure. Par-
ticipating hosts will be able to provide system status information to Tennison,
acting as additional evidence for decisions made within the coordinator. For
example, sensing on the host can be integrated into the threshold logic that
is at the core of the coordinator behaviour, improving in-network monitoring
granularity whilst performing further actions such as heavyweight deep-packet
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inspection.
Additionally, this integration provides room for new functionality, as be-
haviour and observations made on the host can then drive decisions made within
the network. This coupling provides close integration between monitoring at
diﬀerent layers, each of which has their own benefits and drawbacks. By com-
bining this with the functionality already present within Tennison, visibility
can be pushed even closer into the network edge, all the way to the end-host
itself. Further synergies are anticipated when remediation is considered; where
it may not be possible to mitigate or stop an ongoing attack or malicious be-
haviour on the device itself, the network can instead provide this close to the
source. This is only possible with a wider and more converged view possible
with an extended Tennison.
6.2.5 Integration with Maturing NFV Technologies
The area of Software Defined Networking and Network Functions Virtualisation
is continually evolving, accruing numerous standards, of which few are widely
used.
The NFV forwarding technology used in this thesis made use of VLANs.
Whilst this solution meant that the system could operate on physical hardware
without changes, it is not standardised or elegant, as a result, VLANs could
not be used alongside network monitoring. As mentioned in Section 3.3, there
are various eﬀorts towards creating a standardised solution to NFV forwarding,
including NSH [161] and SRv6 [81]. When these specifications are implemented
in hardware, the systems in this thesis can make use of them.
At the time of designing and implementing Tennison and Siren, NFV
orchestrators such as OSM or ONAP are not mature enough to implement a
full monitoring solution for the Cloud-to-Fog continuum. For example, they still
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do not have a solution to VNF forwarding, or distributed and heterogeneous
NFVIs. Moving forward, as these NFV MANOs mature and support aspects
such as VNF placement, network context, and distirbuted NFVIs, then they
could be used to benefit the work in this thesis and could be merged with
Siren. This would provide Tennison with the maturity of a production grade
orchestrator, potentially oﬀering multiple methods of orchestration that could




A.1 ONOS Scaling Analysis
Figure A.1: ONOS Pending Flows








This document is aimed at developers for Tennison, reducing the learning curve
of execute, testing, using, and adding to the system. Enclosed is a comprehensive
developer’s guide on how to use and build on top of the Tennison system. It firstly
explains a technical overview of the system, describing relationships between system
components and their associated code. Supporting this, snippets from the Git wiki are
included in the appendix. After this, it covers a ”getting started” guide, explaining
how to get the system up and running, including how to build the latest version of
ONOS with the Tennison applications. Finally, after understanding Tennison, the
guide shows one how to exercise the system through a series of attacks.
Please note that this document is a continuing work in progress and is not neces-
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1 Technical system overview
This section covers the technical aspects of the system, firstly describing the system as a
whole, then moving into detail on specific components and APIs.
The general relationship between the various Tennison components and their code are
explained in Appendix A. These have been split into 4 sections, from the bottom up, this
includes: the network, the network controller (ONOS), the coordinator, and northbound
applications. In the example, all northbound applications are written in python, though as
they are interfaced over rest, new applications could be written in any language1. ONOS’s
northbound applications are written in Java using the Karaf framework Maven build files
to perform linking between interfaces and primary implementations of interfaces or abstract
classes. The coordinator and the truﬄe code around snort (not shown on diagram) are both
written in python 3.
Appendix B shows the class diagram of the coordinator. A python application that holds a
set of thresholds that affect the southbound connection to the network via ONOS and are
modified by the northbound interface through remote applications.
Appendix C describes the specific details around the ONOS Flow API. These are otherwise
known as onos-tennison-apps in the git project. The REST API here allows one to mod-
ify the network, redirecting and blocking traffic. Later in this appendix specifics around
implementations of intents are discussed.
API calls offered by Tennison’s northbound interface (known as watson.py in code) are
detailed in Appendix D. This also instructs one on how to install an application such that
it can be started, stopped, and altered by the coordinator (and the GUI).
For modification of Tennison’s external components one should refer to the collectors.
These are shown in Appendix E and describe the communication generated from snort,
sFlowRT, and ONOS-IPFIX to the coordinator. A new one of these collectors would have
to be created to support any additional monitoring engines or DPIs.
Appendix F describes the REST calls available for modifying rules within snort. The live
manipulation of snort rules is managed in the tennison.py class (not shown in the relationship
diagram).
1Note: if an auto-ran then command would have to be modified to match language, the default is python.
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2 Tennison usage guide
2.1 Getting started (The quick way)
The following guide is assuming you are using vagrant box 11 with the correct vagrant file.
It is recommended that this is ran with at least 2GBs of RAM, and more if running at
scale. Currently there are various steps required to do to ensure that the system operates as
expected.
To launch ONOS locally2:
$ onos−buck run onos−local c l ean
in /home/ vagrant / onos /
Using the keyword ”clean” in the command makes sure that the the local instance of ONOS
will be refreshed. Running as a service will run an older version and will not work.
To install the ONOS apps:
$ . / i n s t a l l a p p s r e m o t e
in /home/ vagrant / secapp /onos−tennison−apps
These apps must be installed each time the ONOS instance is reset.
To launch Mininet with Tennison and snort:
$ sudo . / tenn i son dev . py −m −a −p
in /home/ vagrant / secapp / topology / tenn i son dev /
To access the ONOS GUI go to:
http : / / 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 8 1 8 1 / onos / u i / index . html
To access the TENNISON GUI go to:
http : / / 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 8 0 8 0 /
2.1.1 Tennison experimenter
This is the latest tool for running Tennison and clustered Tennison. Check this tool out
in the tools/dev/ directory.
2If ONOS is restarted then Mininet should also be restarted, otherwise ONOS may not detect the Snort
instances.
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2.2 Getting started (From scratch)
Before reading this section, see install tennison.sh in the coordinator git reposi-
tory
2.3 Developer guide
This is a quick guide on how to develop with ONOS inside our vagrant box. ONOS provides
various guides on how to do this, however they can be misleading as the documentation is
fragmented and based on different versions of the code. https://wiki.onosproject.org/
display/ONOS/Developer+Guide
To build ONOS (assuming version 1.10 or higher is used) do:
$ onos−buck bu i ld onos
in /home/ vagrant / onos /
This should take around 5−10 minutes to run , l e s s time i f r e b u i l d i n g .
To build the ONOS apps:
$ onos−buck−publ i sh−local
$ mcis
in /home/ vagrant / secapp /onos−tennison−apps
To install ONOS apps run (ONOS must be running):
$ . / i n s t a l l a p p s r e m o t e
in /home/ vagrant / secapp /onos−tennison−apps
To make sure the apps are launched in the r i g h t order , r e s t a r t ONOS
Instructions on how to install used an IDE with ONOS can be found at: https://wiki.
onosproject.org/display/ONOS/Importing+ONOS+projects+into+IntelliJ+IDEA
2.3.1 Upgrading the ONOS version
First, copy the SecurityPipeline.java file, the onos-drivers.xml file and the local cell file from
the current ONOS installation:
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$ cp ˜/ onos / d r i v e r s / d e f a u l t / s r c /main/ java / org / onosp ro j e c t / d r i v e r /
p i p e l i n e / S e c u r i t y P i p e l i n e . java ˜
$ cp ˜/ onos / d r i v e r s / d e f a u l t / s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s /onos−d r i v e r s . xml ˜
$ cp ˜/ onos / t o o l s / test / c e l l s / local ˜
onos-drivers.xml is used to link together pipelines and devices, it must be modified if testing
with something other than OvS. The local cell file tells ONOS the IP address to use when
running locally.
Next, remove the old version of ONOS and use git to clone the desired version of the repos-
itory from https://github.com/opennetworkinglab/onos :
$ sudo rm −r ˜/ onos
$ g i t c l one https : // github . com/ opennetworkinglab / onos
in /home/ vagrant /
Finally, replace the files in the new installation with the files we copied from the old instal-
lation, source the bash profile and build ONOS:
$ mv ˜/ S e c u r i t y P i p e l i n e . java ˜/ onos / d r i v e r s / d e f a u l t / s r c /main/ java / org / onosp ro j e c t / d r i v e r /
p i p e l i n e /
$ rm ˜/ onos / d r i v e r s / d e f a u l t / s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s /onos−d r i v e r s . xml
$ mv ˜/ onos−d r i v e r s . xml ˜/ onos / d r i v e r s / d e f a u l t / s r c /main/ r e s o u r c e s /
$ rm ˜/ onos / t o o l s / test / c e l l s / local
$ mv ˜/ local ˜/ onos / t o o l s / test / c e l l s /
$ source ˜/ onos / t o o l s /dev/ b a s h p r o f i l e
$ onos−buck bu i ld onos
This may take some time to complete as ONOS we have to rebuild from scratch.
To update the ONOS apps, look in the /home/vagrant/onos/onos.defs file for ”ONOS VER-
SION”, then find and replace the version (assuming ONOS 1.10.4 was the old version) and
rebuild the apps using the commands:
$ grep −r l ’1 .10.4−SNAPSHOT’ . / | xargs sed − i
’ s /1.10.4−SNAPSHOT/{ONOS VERSION}/g ’
$ mcis
in /home/ vagrant / secapp /onos−tennison−apps/
If the ONOS version is relatively new, the maven repositories may not have been updated
yet so the additional command below must be run before building the apps:
$ onos−buck−publ i sh−local
in /home/ vagrant / onos
6
Appendix B. Tennison Developer’s Guide 154
Manually update onos-drivers.xml. Copy over the line for the security driver to
the latest onos-drivers.xml
3 Attack demonstration guide
This section includes attack instructions and explanations which were used for the WP4
demonstration.
3.1 Attack Demo - Port scan
Firstly, enable the ipfix portscan app in the TENNISON GUI.
Exploit Portscan attack on single host (h12)
mininet> h8 nmap −n −p− −sA 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 2
Note: -sA (SYN scan) instead of -sT (connect() scan). A connect() scan causes the source
port to also change and an actual connection is attempted, this results in a port scan being
detected in both directions and therefore both being blocked. -n to prevent nmap resolving
addresses (delay at the start)
Detection The ipfix-portscan-app monitors the variance of ports being contacted by a
single host. On the detection of an ongoing port scan from a specific source the following
ipfix threshold is installed:
” subtype ” : ” p r e f i x ” ,
” treatment ” : ” b lock ” ,
” f i e l d s ” :{ ” sourceIPv4Address ” : X.X.X.X} ,
” t r e a t m e n t f i e l d s ” :{ ” sourceIPv4Address ” : X.X.X.X} ,
” p r i o r i t y ” : 10
3.2 Attack Demo - DDoS
Firstly, enable the ipfix DDoS app in the TENNISON GUI.
7
Appendix B. Tennison Developer’s Guide 155
Figure 1: Port scan threshold details
Exploit Running SYN flood DDoS attack on a web server (h15). The distributed aspect
is simulated by spoofing random source IP addresses (–rand-source).
mininet> h10 hping3 −c 500 −d 120 −S −w 64 −p 80 −−f a s t −−rand−source h15
For sending at different rates use ’-i’ and specify the delay between packets.
Detection The distributed nature is first picked up by ipfix-ddos-app which discovers
nodes with a high variance of querying nodes. This is then considered a server undergoing
a potential DDoS attack and so all traffic querying the server is mirrored by ipfix-ddos-app
installing the following (example) threshold:
’ t r e a t m e n t f i e l d s ’ : { ’ dest inat ionIPv4Address ’ : ’< s e rve r > ’} ,
’ treatment ’ : ’ sno r t mi r ro r ’ ,
’ f i e l d s ’ : { ’ dest inat ionIPv4Address ’ : ’< s e rve r > ’} ,
’ subtype ’ : ’ p r e f i x ’ ,
’ p r i o r i t y ’ : 10
The idea what then to use snort to make the distinction between malicious traffic and
legitimate traffic, which may not be possible. The extent of snort rules for detecting SYN
flood attack only goes as far as:
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Figure 2: Screen capture of GUI displaying snort DDoS alert
Other Solutions
1. It may be possible to differentiate by some other payload value (insert something unique
to the attack traffic).
2. Different DDoS attacks may be possible for snort to separate attack traffic from legit-
imate triaffic .e.g jolt attack, teardrop, IGMP, dos auth - these all have corresponding
rules in dos.rules - after looking into there they all seem specific to windows NT/95
etc.
3. Remediate on the snort alert, would cause all traffic to be blocked and therefore en-
forcing the denial of service. The following snort threshold would be used to match
the snort alert and then block the destination IP address.
3.3 Attack Demo - Intrusion detection
No app is required for detection of this exploit (though one could be made to enhance
detection).
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mininet> h5 vs f tpd &
Attempt the exploit:
mininet> h20 f tp h5
Name ( 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 5 : vagrant ) : x : )
Password : any
$ nc 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 5 6200
Once the ftp client hangs the backdoor will be open on port 6200, access with:
Detection We assume that we know there is an FTP server on the network so we mirror
all port 21 traffic. Alternatively, to be more precise mirroring can be done on the server
itself. For information on what these look like, go to the IPFIX thresholds tab on the GUI
or look in examples/threshold.yaml.
Attempting the exploit will the trigger the following snort rule:
a l e r t tcp any any −> any 21 (msg : ”VSFTPD Backdoor” ;
f low : e s t ab l i s h e d , t o s e r v e r ; content : ”USER ” ; depth : 5 ;
content : ” |3 a 29 | ” ; d i s t anc e : 0 ; s i d : 2013188 ; rev : 1 ; )
Note: the ftp client seems to be miss-calculating the checksum on USER and PASS packets
(the packets we want to detect). By default snort does not consider packets with invalid
checksums, so the following config is needed (within rules file):
The snort alert is then matched with the following snort threshold which blocks all com-
munication from the host attempting the exploit, therefore blocking the backdoor. The $
symbol takes the sourceIPv4Address from the alert message (taken from the packet that
triggered the alert).
a le r tmsg : ’VSFTPD Backdoor ’ ,
p r i o r i t y : 10 ,
treatment : block ,
t r e a t m e n t f i e l d s : { sourceIPv4Address : $}
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Figure 3: Screen capture of GUI displaying snort VSFTP alert
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A Tennison technical overview
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B Class diagram of coordinator
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Path Type Description Parameters
/ipfix/add/ <saddr> / <sport> / <daddr> / <dport> /
<protocol>
GET Adds	an	IPFIX	monitoring	intent
C Tennison flow API
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/redirect/add/{saddr}/{sport}/{daddr}/{dport}/{protocol} GET Adds	redirection	monitoring	intent 5-tuple	flow
/redirect/delete/{saddr}/{sport}/{daddr}/{dport}/{protocol} GET
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Remediation
Path Type Description Parameters
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GET Removes	the	snort	instance	from	above.	Added	in	Phase	2. <ip> 	-	IP	Address	of	snort
instance
























































































D Tennison northbound interface
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E Tennison collector API
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	 	 	 "tv_sec"	:	1747356,




















	 	 	 "tv_sec"	:	447323224,













Path Type Description Parameters


























Path Type Description Parameters
/snort/rule/clear POST Clear	all	rules	from	snort None
/snort/rule/delete POST Delete	specific	rule	from	snort Content-Type:	application/json	{	"rules"	:	[	"rule	1",	"rule	2	]	}
/snort/rule/add POST Add	rule	to	snort Content-Type:	application/json	{	"rule"	:	[	"rule	1",	"rule	2	]	}
F Truﬄe API
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